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WHAT IS "(IM)PARTIAL ENOUGH" IN A
WORLD OF EMBEDDED NEUTRALS?
Nancy A. Welsh*
The Supreme Court's decision in Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co. highlighted
the fragility of judicial independence and impartiality in the United States. A
similar, less-noticed fragility of independence and impartiality exists among the
arbitrators, mediators and administrative hearing officers who resolve an
increasing number of disputes. Everywhere one looks, there is unremarked yet
remarkable evidence of the rise of "embedded neutrals, " particularly in uneven
contexts between one-time and repeat players. This phenomenon becomes
particularly worrisome when the embedded neutral 's role is due to their special
relationship with the repeat player, and the one-time player is not as sophisticated
as the repeat player, has not voluntarily or knowingly chosen the dispute
re.slution forum that will be used to resolve their dispute, and is either unaware of
the special relationship between the neutral and the repeat player or effectively
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unable to challenge it. As dispute resolution becomes a lucrative private business,
it is easy to begin to worry about the corrupting influence of repeat business and
money on the ability of embedded neutrals to "hold the balance nice, clear and
true. " The Supreme Court, however, seems largely oblivious to these concerns.
The Court has encouraged deference to the decisions and settlement agreements
these neutrals produce and has regularly rejected one-time players' claims of
structural bias. This Article explores whether the analysis in Caperton and its
antecedents-i.e., conducting a close examination of the volume and flow of
monies that may provide direct and indirect benefit to the neutral, their timing,
and the plausibility of their effect on an adjudicated outcome, in order to
determine whether the risk of actual bias is "too high " to be deemed
"constitutionally tolerable'"-could be applied to assess the sufficiency of the
impartiality offered by embedded neutrals and private dispute resolution
organizations when they are treated as adequate-and sometimes
superior-replacements for independent and public trial courts.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court took the extraordinary measure of
announcing that West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Justice Brent Benjamin
had violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when he
refused to recuse himself in Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.' Writing on behalf
of a majority of the Court, Justice Kennedy detailed the nearly $3 million in
campaign contributions that had been directed to Justice Benjamin's campaign by
defendant A. T. Massey's board chairman and principal officer, Don Blankenship,
the "temporal" relationship among these contributions, Justice Benjamin's
electoral victory, and the central role that he played in two decisions that reversed
a $50 million jury verdict against Massey.2 Ultimately, the Supreme Court
concluded that the situation in this case presented "too high" a risk of actual bias to
be deemed "constitutionally tolerable." 3
With its decision, the Supreme Court upheld the exceptionalism of, and
public respect for, the independence and impartiality of America's judges. The
decision challenged some citizens' perception that judges can be unduly influenced
by those with money and power. 4 Such suspicion resonates in the press coverage
of a variety of relatively recent events involving the Supreme Court: its decision in
Bush v. Gore,5 Justice Scalia's refusal to recuse himself in Cheney v. U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia, 6 and even the nomination of Harriet Miers for
the Supreme Court.
The press itself, of course, is not immune to accusations of undue
influence. Indeed, during the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, American citizens
were introduced to the concept of the "embedded joumalist.,,7 Pentagon officials
claimed that they were limiting journalists' access in order to ensure their safety
and protect secret military operations, but the officials also must have been aware
that the journalists' reporting would be influenced by what the military permitted
them to see and how the military framed these events.
A similar dynamic is also occurring within the ranks of the neutrals who
assist with the resolution of many legal disputes--e.g., administrative adjudicators,
arbitrators, and mediators. Today, these are often "embedded neutrals,"8 whose
1. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
2. Id. at 2256-60.
3. Id. at 2257.
4. See generally Symposium, Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 60 SYRACtUSE
L. REV. 215 (2009) (offering various perspectives regarding the underlying reasons for, and
implications of, the Caperton decision); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Completing Caperton and
Clarifying Common Sense Through Using the Right Standard for Constitutional Judicial
Recusal, 29 REv. LITIG. 249 (2010).
5. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
6. 541 U.S. 913 (2004).
7. News hour: Pros and Cons of Embedded Journalism (PBS television
broadcast Mar. 27, 2003), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/Jan-
june03/embed_-3-27.html (observing that before an embedded journalist may join a
battalion, he or she must sign a contract restricting what he or she will report and when).
8. See Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes, 31 UCLA L. R.ev.
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involvement is the result of their association with one or more of the parties
involved in the dispute. Neutrals of this type have long existed to resolve disputes
within workplaces, 9 faith communities,' 0 or between sophisticated parties who are
members of the same trade or profession and have voluntarily chosen to be bound
by an arbitrator's decision."' Generally, this is not a problem. In these instances,
the embedded neutral often represents a wise, respected elder within the
community or identity group to which both parties belong. This sort of embedded
neutral thus shares the norms that animate both of the disputing parties and can
help to resolve their dispute in a manner that both parties are likely to view as
principled.'12
4, 17 (1983). Galanter first referenced "embedded forums," noting that they
range from those which are hardly distinguishable from the everyday
decisionmaking within an institution ("I'd like to see the manager.") to
those which are specially constituted to handle disputes which cannot be
resolved by everyday processes. . . . Resort to embedded forums is
encouraged where there are continuing relations between the disputants.
Continuing relations raise the cost of exit, they increase the likelihood of
some shared norms, and they supply opportunities for application of
sanctions-e.g., by direct withdrawal of beneficial relations or by
damage to reputation that reduces prospects for other beneficial
relations.
Id
9. See CHRISTOPHER MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES
FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 41-50 (1996) (describing the "social network mediator" and three
variations of the "authoritative mediator"-i .e., benevolent mediator,
administrative/managerial mediator, and vested interest mediator).
10. See Matthew 18:15-20 (urging someone who has been wronged to first speak
to the alleged wrongdoer, then to summon another, and then to refer the matter to the
church); JANE E. CALVERT, QUAKER CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF
JOHN DICKINSON (2008); WILLIAM M. OFFUTT, JR., OF "GOOD LAWS" AND "GOOD MEN":
LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE DELAWARE VALLEY, 1680-1710, at 146 (1995) (discussing
Quaker "Gospel Order" dispute resolution system that put disputes in the hands of small
groups of community members to keep decisions away from outsiders); see also E. Gary
Spitko, Judge Not: In Defense of Minority-Culture Arbitration, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1065,
1065 (1999) (urging that "[m]inority-culture arbitration not only has great utility as a
needed safe harbor from majoritarian bias, it also holds great promise as an instrument of
systemic change").
11. See Michael S. Maza, Arbitrator Selection and Neutrality Under the Railway
Labor Act: An Airline Employee's Perspective, 4 J. Am. ARB. 327 (2005) (describing the
arbitration process used by Northwest Airlines and its unionized pilots, focusing on the
parties' selection of arbitrator panels that include two "party arbitrators").
12. See Amy J. Schmitz, Consideration of "Contracting Cultures " in Enforcing
Arbitration Provisions, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 123 (2007). Professor Schmitz contrasts
"extra communal contracting cultures" with "intra communal contracting cultures." Id. at
145. The former are likely to involve one-time vs. repeat players and noticeable disparities
of power. Id. at 146. In contrast, "it seems that the more intra communal a culture is, the
more likely it is that negotiators within that culture will have cooperative attitudes. Mutual
dispute resolution values and needs in more intra communal contracting cultures may
counteract uneven economic resources and lead to reasonable arbitration provisions." Id. at
165.
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But the use of embedded neutrals becomes worrisome when the neutrals'
role is due to their special relationship with just one of the parties, usually the more
powerfuil repeat player, in uneven contests between that repeat player and a
one-time player.'13 This concern is especially strong when the one-time player is
not as sophisticated as the repeat player, has not voluntarily or knowingly chosen
the dispute resolution forum that will be used to resolve her dispute, and is either
unaware of the special relationship between the neutral and the repeat player or
aware of the relationship but effectively unable to challenge it.'14 Consider, for
example, the requirement that an individual citizen exhaust the administrative
procedures of an agency before a hearing officer who is the employee or paid
contractor of the very agency whose policies and practices the individual is
challenging.' 5 Consider mandatory arbitration conducted pursuant to a clause in a
13. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves " Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SocWY REV. 95 (1974). Galanter notes the significant
advantages that repeat players enjoy in comparison to one-time players-e.g., experience
leading to changes in how the repeat-player structures the next similar transaction;
expertise, economies of scale, and access to specialist advocates; informal continuing
relationships with institutional incumbents; bargaining reputation and credibility; long-term
strategies facilitating risk-taking in appropriate cases; influencing rules through lobbying
and other use of resources; playing for precedent and favorable future rules; distinguishing
between symbolic and actual defeats; and investing resources in getting rules favorable to
them implemented-and contrasting these to disadvantages borne by one-time players-
e.g., more at stake in given case; more risk averse; more interested in immediate over long-
term gain; less interested in precedent and favorable rules; not able to form continuing
relationships with courts or institutional representatives; not able to use experience to
structure future similar transactions; limited access to specialist advocates. Id. at 97-100;
see also Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, I EMP. Rrs.
& EMP. POL'Y J. 189, 195 (1997); Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive
Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards,
29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 225-27 (1998) (observing that repeat-player employers fare
better in arbitration than one-shot employees, that when repeat-player employers lose,
damages are lower than for one-time employers, and generally that enforcement of
predispute arbitration agreements allows employers to structure the arbitration process to
their advantage); Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: "The
Problem" in Court-Oriented Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 863, 874-76 (2008)
(observing that the structure of court-oriented mediation has evolved to favor preferences of
repeat players).
14. My thanks to my colleague, Catherine Rogers, for her assistance in helping
me to clarify these elements.
15. See OwEN M. Fiss & JUDITH RESNIK, ADJUDICATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES:
AN INTRODUCTION TO PROCEDURE 40 (2003) (describing agency employees "fulfilling
judge-like roles but doing so outside the confines" of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)); Judith Resnik, "Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice ": Inventing the Federal
District Courts of the Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90
GEO. L.J. 607, 662-63 (2002) (noting the extent to which agencies are expanding the ranks
of hearing officers, hearing examiners and other decisionmnakers who do not fall within the
protections of the APA); see also Jeffr~ey S. Lubbers, APA -Adudication: Is the Quest for
Uniformity Faltering?, 10 ADMIN. L. J. Am. U. 65, 70-71 (1996) (regarding non-APA
judges in Departments of Justice, Agriculture and Defense); PENN STATE LAW, CTR. FOR
IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS, PLAYING POLITICS AT THE BENCH: A WHITE PAPER ON THE JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT'S INVESTIGATION INTO THE HIRING PRACTICES OF IMMIGRATION JUDGES (2009)
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boilerplate contract when the more-powerfuil employer or financial services
company creates the contract, inserts the arbitration clause, specifies that the
arbitration will be conducted by its own trade association' 6 or an organization that
solicited inclusion in the contract, and refuses to permit an employee or consumer
to opt out of the arbitration process.'17 Even consider voluntary mediation offered
by an employer, hospital, or agency as an alternative to litigation, arbitration, 18
negotiation, or investigation when the mediators have been admitted to the repeat
players' panel because they possess the particular experience, knowledge, and/or
approach that the repeat player values.' 9
(raising concerns regarding the politicized hiring of unqualified immigration judges and
proposing reforms).
16. See, e.g., Harter v. Iowa Grain Co., 220 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2000) (in dispute
between corn farmer and operator of grain elevators, contract provided for arbitration by
National Grain & Feed Association; operator was a member of NGFA, paid more than
$26,000 annually in dues, and bad a top employee on NGFA's board; court nonetheless
found that "[e]ven if all these facts are true, they do not establish the direct, definite,
demonstrable bias required"); Dolton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 935
A.2d 295 (D.C. 2007) (after losing nearly $300,000, investors brought action against
brokerage firm for failure to diversify holdings after alleged repeated requests to do so;
complaint was brought before NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc., which denied claim; lower
court and D.C. Court of Appeals refused to vacate the award, finding insufficient evidence);
Hottle v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 846 A.2d 862 (Conn. 2004) (employee subjected to
arbitration before a five member panel of partners from his accounting firm).
17. Suspicion heightened after some ADR firms announced that they would not
enforce boilerplate waivers of class action arbitrations, then "back[ed] down" in the face of
objections from lenders and other financial services institutions. See Alan S. Kaplinsky &
Mark J. Levin, Is JAMS in a Jam Over Its Policy Regarding Class Action Waivers in
Consumer Arbitration Agreements?, 61 Bus. LAW. 923 (2006); Erick Bergquist, JAMS
Backs Down on Class-Action Arbitration, Am. BANKER, Mar. 11, 2005, at 1-5.
18. See, e.g., Jill 1. Gross, Securities Mediation: Dispute Resolution for the
Individual Investor, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 329 (2006).
19. See, e.g., Howard Gadlin, Bargaining in the Shadow of Management:
Integrated Conflict Management Systems, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 381
(Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005) (describing how mediation and other
dispute resolution processes have been co-opted by managers to reassert their authority);
Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL.
573, 591-93, 660 (2004) (describing measures used by the U.S. Postal Service to ensure
conformity with transformative model of mediation and selection criteria used by the
Pennsylvania Special Education Mediation Service); Leah Wing, Mediation and Inequality
Reconsidered: Bringing the Discussion to the Table, 26 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 383 (2009);
Howard Gadlin, Addressing the Thornier Complexities of Racial Discrimination Complaints
in the Workplace, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2009, at 25-26 (expressing uneasiness about
use of mediation to respond to employment discrimination claims and noting that "most
people in the field are quick to dismiss neutrality as a myth and to challenge the ideal of
impartiality as illusory even while those terms continue to be employed in most formal and
informal mediator job descriptions"); Christopher Guadagnino, Malpractice Mediation
Poised to Expand, PHYSICIAN's NEWS DIG., Apr. 2004, available at
http://www.physiciansnews.com/cover/404.html ("The first institution in Pa. to adopt a
formal co-mediation program is Drexel University College of Medicine in Philadelphia,
which recently became self-insured after its previous malpractice insurer pulled out of the
medical malpractice line of business, according to Drexel's Chief Counsel Tobey Oxhohn,
400
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As alternative dispute resolution (ADR)-and access to the role of
neutral-has become institutionalized by repeat players, it has also become a
lucrative private business, at least for some. 2 0 There are now notable instances of
judges leaving the bench or retiring to become private arbitrators and mediators.2
Very recently, the American Bar Association reported that an arbitrator charged
$900 per hour for his services and assessed a total fee of $400,000 after casting his
vote for a pay increase for New York City transit workers.2 Other mediators
charge similarly high rates. 23
Commentators have begun to object to the corrupting influence--or, at
the very least, the appearance of a corrupting influence-of repeat business and
,,24
money on embedded neutrals' ability to "hold the balance nice, clear and true,
particularly in uneven contests between unsophisticated one-time players and the
powerful repeat players who require participation as a condition of doing business
with them. While commentators have raised such concerns in the administrative
law realm,25 and other commentators are beginning to raise such concerns about
in-house 26or agency-connected 27 mediation programs, the most significant
concerns have involved private, binding, mandatory arbitration. 2 8
Esq.").
20. See, e.g., Linda R. Singer & Michael K. Lewis, Looking Forward in
Mediation: Today's Successes and Tomorrow's Challenges, Disp. RESOL. MAG.,
Spring/Summer 2008, at 15, 16 (reporting that "JAMS, the only national for-profit company
offering the services of fuill-time, professional neutrals, maintains 23 offices across the
country, with approximately 200 fuill-time mediators and arbitrators. It currently generates
approximately $100 million in annual revenue."); Chris Serres, Arbitrary Concern for the
National Arbitration Forum, STAR TRIB., May 10, 2008 (reporting that public documents
show that NAF earned $10.14 million in 2006 on revenues of $39.37 million), available at
http://www.startribune.com/business/18812529.html. Admittedly, however, some sectors of
the dispute resolution field-e.g., community mediation, victim-offender mediation, special
education mediation-remain a public service or avocation.
21. See, e.g., Michael D. Hausfeld, Michael P. Lehmann & Megan E. Jones,
Observations from the Field: ACPERA's First Five Years, 10 SEDONA CONE. J. 95, 107
(2009) (describing retired Honorable Daniel Weinstein of JAMS as "one of the nation's
preeminent mediators of complex civil disputes").
22. See Martha Neil, Lawyer's $900/Hour Arbitration Fee Angers Transit Board
Members, A.B.A. J., Oct. 28, 2009, available at http://www.abajournal.comlnews/article/
lawyers -900hour-arbitration -fee -angers transit_board-members!.
23. See Urska Velikonja, Making Peace and Making Money: Economic Analysis
of the Market for Mediators in Private Practice, 72 ALB. L. REv. 257, 267-68 (2009)
(reporting that most mediators provide services on a part-time basis, but perhaps 1000
mediators gross $200,000 or more per year; a much smaller number consistently bill more
than $1 million per year).
24. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
25. See John Hardwicke & Thomas E. Ewing, The Central Panel: A Response to
Critics, 24 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADmiN. L. JUDGEs 231, 232 (2004) (arguing that any system in
which decisionmakers are embedded within the agency creates the potential for "pressure
on [decisionmakers] to produce decisions favorable to the agency"), cited in Emily M.
Rector, Removing the State from Administrative Agencies, 84 NoTRE DAME L. R~v. 2269
(2009).
26. See Howard GadI in, Addressing the Thornier Complexities of Racial
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Discrimination Complaints in the Workplace, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2009, at 27 ("1
think the EEO ADR process results in grievance settlement rather than discrimination
reduction. One would be hard pressed to find objective data or subjective reports that
discrimination has been reduced as a result of mediation programs, or even that the racial
climate in most agencies has improved."); Howard Gadlin, Bargaining in the Shadow of
Management: Integrated Conflict Management Systems, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 371 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005).
27. See Welsh, supra note 19, at 651-70 (raising concerns within the context of
Pennsylvania's special education mediation program).
28. In addition to the debate dealing directly with the advantages and
disadvantages of mandatory arbitration clauses, described in the text, many courts and
commentators have addressed these concerns in discussing unconscionability and arbitrator
bias. See, e.g., Mercuro v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles County, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671,
678-79 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (making repeat-player effect part of substantive
unconscionability analysis and observing: "the fact that an employer repeatedly appears
before the same group of arbitrators conveys distinct advantages over the individual
employee . . . [which include] knowledge of the arbitrators' temperaments, procedural
preferences, styles and the like and the arbitrators' cultivation of further business by taking
a 'split the difference' approach to damages" and finding it significant that the arbitration
agreement provided for arbitral hearings "to be held within the federal judicial district in
which the employee was last employed by the company" because there were only eight
NAF arbitrators with offices in the Central District of California, thus making the likelihood
of the repeat-player effect more significant though not sufficient by itself to make the
arbitration agreement unconscionable); Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 8
(Mont. 2002) (articulating eight factors for when an arbitration provision would be
unconscionable, including whether "arbitrators tend to favor 'repeat players,' as opposed to
workers or consumers who are unlikely to be involved in arbitration again"); Alan Scott
Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 3 8 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 487 (1997); Catherine A. Rogers,
The Arrival of the "Have-Nots" in International Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.J. 341 (2007);
Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators: A Functional Approach to
Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 53 (2005); Amy J. Schmitz,
Embracing Unconscionability 's Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REv. 73 (2006); David S.
Schwartz, If You Love Arbitration, Set It Free: How "Mandatory" Undermines
"Arbitration," 8 NEV. LiJ. 400 (2007) [hereinafter Schwartz, If You Love Arbitration];
David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1247
(2009); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of
Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 757 (2004); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Mandating Minimum Quality in Mass
Arbitration, 76 U. CIN'. L. REv. 383, 401, 406, n.44-45, n.52 (2008) [hereinafter Stempel,
Mandating Minimum Quality]. In a series of cases, the Montana district court, in applying
the factors from KMoss, accepted the testimony of Professor William Corbett that "arbitrators
tend to favor repeat players in securities arbitrations" and denied U.S. Bancorp Piper
Jaffray's motions to compel arbitration. See Zigrang v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Inc., No.
DV-02-77 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1122 (Nov. 9, 2006); Mett v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray,
Inc., No. DV-02-29 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1255 (Apr. 22, 2005); Estate of Alice A. Franey v.
U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray. Inc., DV-02-36 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 2170 (Apr. 22, 2004);
Tomazich v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaifray. Inc., DV-02-131 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 3702 (Apr. 7,
2004); Willems v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffiray. Inc., DV-03-25 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 3691
(Apr. 7, 2004); Zigrang v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray. Inc., DV-02-77 Mont. Dist. LEXIS
3704 (Apr. 7, 2004). In three different decisions, three different courts concluded that the
arbitration provider that Ryan's Family Steak Houses decided to use, Employment Dispute
Services, Inc. (EDS), was biased in favor of repeat players. See Penn v. Ryan's Family
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In part, this critical focus on mandatory arbitration is the result of
California's statutory requirement2 that arbitral organizations make public
disclosures of information that might indicate personal favoritism toward repeat
players, as well as potential bias on 3the part of the provider organizations with
which the arbitrators are associated.3 0 Drawn to the data that these disclosure
requirements produced, advocacy groups and academics began looking for
patterns. Within the last couple of years, they have released position papers and
reports grounded in California data.3  In turn, reporters,3  legislators,3
Steak Houses, Inc., 269 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2001); Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses,
Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 314 (6th Cir. 2000); Walker v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 289 F.
Supp. 2d 916, 924 (M.D. Tenn. 2003) (observing that Ryan's paid half of the organization's
gross income in a year); Geiger v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 985,
995 (S.D. Ind. 2001). In two out of the three cases, the court denied Ryan's motion to
compel because it found that the arbitration provision was unconscionable due to repeat-
player bias. In Penn, the court found that the EDS system was not inherently biased, but
denied the motion to compel based on a finding that the agreement lacked "mutuality of
obligation" thus rendering the contract unenforceable. 269 F.3d at 759. In refusing to
enforce the arbitration clause, the court took notice of the finding that that EDS 's sole
business was employment disputes thus making it inappropriately dependent on garnering
business from employers. The court thus distinguished EDS from AAA and NAF which had
other sources of business. The court's primary focus, however, was on EDS's control over
the arbitration procedures. Id at 757. EDS had the right under its rules to set the time and
location of the arbitration proceedings, could modify and interpret its rules, and had
complete control over the names of potential arbitrators from which the employer and
employee chose. Id. According to the court, this level of discretion rendered the employee's
role in selection of the arbitrator essentially meaningless. Id. at 759.
29. Legislation was introduced after a series of newspaper articles revealed
apparent inequities in the arbitration of disputes between securities firms and their
employees. See Reynolds Holding, Millions Are Losing Their Legal Rights, S.F. CHRON.,
Oct. 7, 2001, at Al; Reynolds Holding, Can Public Count on Fair Arbitration?, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 8, 2001, at A15; Reynolds Holding, Judges' Actions Cast Shadow on Court
Integrity, S.F. Cn-RON., Oct. 9, 200 1, at A 13.
30. See Jay Folberg, Arbitration Ethics-Is California the Future?, 18 OHIO ST.
J. ON Disp. RESOL. 343, 347 (2003); Ruth V. Glick, California Arbitration Reform: The
Aftermath, U.S.F. L. REV. (2009); Richard Chernick, Imposed-Arbitration Reforms Threaten
To Stifle Strengths of Commercial Arbitration, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2002, at 16; Jay
Folberg, Arbitration Ethics. Winds of Reform Blowing from the West?, Disp. RESOL. MAG.,
Fall 2002, at 5 (describing reasons underlying establishment of new disclosure requirements
for arbitrators in California); Gail Hillebrand, Should California 's Ethics Rules Be Adopted
Nationwide?, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2002, at 10.
31. See infra Part 11.
32. See Wade Goodwyn, Rape Victim'~s Case Shows Failings of Arbitration,
NPR, June 9, 2009, available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=105 153315 (describing Public
Citizen report and story of Halliburton employee who was allegedly raped by other
employees and now seeks to bring suit against Halliburton while Halliburton is requiring
employee to pursue claim through arbitration).
33. See Press Release, Congressman Dennis Kucinich, Kucinich Applauds Bank
of America for Abandoning Mandatory Arbitration (Aug. 13, 2009) (referencing
subcommittee investigation and report), available at
http://oversight.house.gov/index.php?option-com-content&task-view&id=4040&ltemnid=3
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academics 314 public attorneys, 35 and even bloggerS36 have begun to cite to these
position papers and reports, often to invoke them as calls to action.
Many others, however, have urged that all is well and that alternative
processes are inherently superior t 3 7-or at least no worse than Ht -those offered
by the courts. The U.S. Supreme Court has clearly aligned itself with this side of
the debate. Indeed, with its arbitral39 and administrative law 40 jurisprudence, the
9.
34. See, e.g., Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C. Vladeck, Contracting (Out)
Rights, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803 (2009).
35. The Office of the City Attorney in San Francisco filed an action against NAF
alleging unfair business practices in arbitrations and in making consumers pay court costs
and undetermined civil penalties. The credit card unit of Bank of America and a collection
company also were named as defendants in the complaint in the action. Sam Zuckerman,
S.F. Sues Credit Card Service, Alleging Bias, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 8, 2008, available at
http://articles.sfgate.com/2008-04-08/business/1 7143343_1_national-arbitration-forum-
credit-card-dispute-resolution.
36. See, e.g., Nancy Welsh, The Rise of the "Embedded Neutral? ", ADR PROF
BLOG, Dec. 5, 2007, http://www.indisputably.org/?p-46#more-46.
37. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of
Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 397 (2009) [hereinafter Carbonneau,
Triumph of Arbitration] (urging that "arbitration personifies due process and justice" and
"enables society to resolve disputes and to prosper by dedicating its resources to other
activities"); Thomas E. Carbonneau, Judicial Approbation in Building the Civilization of
Arbitration, 11 3 PENN ST. L. REv. 1343 (2009).
38. See SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., CONSUMER ARBITRATION BEFORE THE
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION: PRELIMINARY REPORT 109-11 (2009), available at
http://www.searlearbitration.org/p/fuill-report.pdf [hereinafter SEARLE ARBITRATION
REPORT].
39. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); Howsam v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,
514 U.S. 52 (1995); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). Professor Thomas Carbonneau has remarked that "[iln its
decisional law, the Court is bent upon delegating as much of the burden of civil litigation as
possible to arbitration." Carbonneau, Triumph ofArbitration, supra note 33, at 396 n.3.
40. See generally NLRB v. Matros Automated Elec. Constr. Corp., No. 09-2249-
ag(L) 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 2788 (2d Cir. Feb. 11, 2010) (following Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951) (holding that factual findings of an ALJ are
entitled to a standard of review based on the substantial evidence test, a highly deferential
standard where these findings can only be overturned if they are not supported, or are
contradicted by the record); John S. Kane, Refining Chevron -Restoring Judicial Review to
Protect Religious Refugees, 60 ADMIN. L. REv. 513, 554 (2008) (immigration judges on the
Board of Immigration Appeals can act as fact finders subject to judicial review under the
substantial evidence test); Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts on Beginnings and Ends: Court
of Appeals Review of Administrative Law Judges' Findings and Opinions, 67 WASH. U.
L.Q. 661 (1989) (describing the great deference accorded to administrative law judges' fact-
finding, resulting in growing power). But see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402 (197 1); Patrick M. Garry, Judicial Review and the "Hard Look " Doctrine, 7
NEV. L.J. 151, 161-62 (2006) ("The purpose of the hard look doctrine 'involves providing a
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Court has encouraged both the development of embedded neutrals and deference
to the decisions and settlement agreements that these neutrals produce. The Court
has also regularly rejected one-time players' general claims of structural bias,
requiring instead that parties prove the existence and impact of such bias in their
cases. 4
Change, however, may be in the air. The oft-introduced' 4 2 oft-ignored
Arbitration Fairness Ac-3which would ban the use of mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clauses in consumer, employment, franchise, and civil rights matters,
among others-has been introduced again in the House and Senate and may be
making progress. The Minnesota Attorney General, meanwhile, recently gathered
sufficient information" to sue the largest U.S. provider of consumer arbitration
substantive judicial check on agency power, through which the courts become a sort of
partner in the policy-making process, guaranteeing that agency decisions serve the public
interest. Under such an approach, only by a vigorous judicial review can society ensure that
administrative agencies act responsibly and democratically."').
41. See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)) (rejecting "generalized attacks
on arbitration" as "far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes
favoring this method of resolving disputes"); Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626-28 ("By agreeing
to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.").
42. See Arbitration-Congress Considers Bill To Invalidate Pre-Dispute
Arbitration Clauses for Consumers, Employees, and Franchisees-Arbitration Fairness Act
of 2007, S. 1782, 11l0th Cong. (2007), 121 HARv. L. REv. 2262 (2008); Arbitration Fairness
Act of 2007, S. 1782, 1 10th Cong. (2007) (banning the use of predispute arbitration
agreements in consumer, employment and franchise contracts); Consumer Fairness Act of
2007, H.R. 1443, 1 10th Cong. (2007) (treating unilaterally imposed arbitration clauses as
unfair and deceptive trade practices and prohibiting use in consumer transactions);
Predatory Mortgage Lending Practices Reduction Act, H.R. 2061, 110th Cong. (2007)
(amending Consumer Credit Protection Act to render unenforcedable any predispute
arbitration agreement in a consumer contract); see also William W. Park, Amending the
Federal Arbitration Act, 13 Am. REv. INT'L ARB. 75, 129-30 (2002). Park observes that
Congress could enact statutory safeguards to protect ill-informed individuals and that
one can still appreciate how arbitration can become an instrument of
injustice when an arbitral institution dominated by a single industry
nominates arbitrators whose reappointment (thus compensation)
indirectly depends on the satisfaction given to the industry. . . . [M]y
goal is simply to emphasize that without limits on spillover from
domestic to international arbitration, the latter may not reach its full
potential due to uncertainty about the level of freedom from judicial
intervention. A separate statute would help to insulate arbitration from
the undue judicial intervention that is inevitable in consumer and
employment cases.
Id; Schwartz, If You Love Arbitration, supra note 28 (observing that legislative proposals
have also included modifying the standard of judicial review for arbitral awards and arguing
against the ineffective "blue-penci ling" of overreaching arbitration clauses).
43. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111 th Cong. (2009).
44. Complaint at 5, State v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum (D. Minn. filed July 14,
2009); see also Complaint, California v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum, (S.F. Co. Super. Ct. filed
Mar. 24, 2008).
406 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 52:395
services, National Arbitration Forum (NAF), for violation of Minnesota statutes
prohibiting consumer fraud, deceptive trade practices, and false advertising. 45 A
settlement quickly ensued in that case, and NAF agreed to cease its consumer
credit-card arbitration services nationwide.4 The venerable American Arbitration
Association (AAA) subsequently announced the suspension and re-examination of
its arbitration services for consumer debt collection disputes.4
Recently, in October 2009, the Wall Street Journal published a front-page
story based on the Minnesota lawsuit against NAF.4 It presents a fascinating yet
depressing story of NAF 's complex relationship with a web of other organizations
involved in debt collection and the ambition of the CEO of one such company
(Accretive) to "build a billion dollar empire in the realm of consumer-debt disputes
.. stand[ing] at the center of a complex arrangement linking America's biggest
arbitrator of consumer credit-card disputes with another business that collects
debts in some of those same cases."4
Now, as some dispute resolution infrastructures begin to crumble and
stories begin to emerge of greed or the quest for power apparently overtaking good
sense, it seems an appropriate time to explore models that exist for effectively
safeguarding the impartiality of embedded neutrals. This Article will consider
whether the analysis in Caperton 50 -_conducting a close examination of the volume
and flow of money, its timing, and the plausibility of its effect on an adjudicated
outcome in order to assess the risk that substantial campaign contributions can
present to the legitimacy of courts conducting a close examination of the volume
and flow of money, its timing, and the plausibility of its effect on an adjudicated
outcome-may serve as one such model. In order to explore this possibility, this
Article will begin by examining the factual details and analysis of Caperton. Part
11 will then discuss the use and perceptions of embedded neutrals, especially in
mandatory arbitration of consumer, employment and securities disputes. Part III
describes the allegations against NAF contained in the complaint in the Minnesota
lawsuit and applies Caperton's constitutional, risk-based objective standard to a
hypothetical individual NAF arbitrator to determine whether NAF's corporate and
financial structure presented such a probability of bias that it made an individual
arbitrator's service inconsistent with the provision of due process. Then in Part IV
45. Complaint at 39-41, State v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum (D. Minn. filed July
14, 2009).
46. Carrck Mollenkamp et al., Turmoil in Arbitration Empire Upends Credit-
Card Disputes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2009, at Al, A20. The National Arbitration Forum and
related companies have also been sued recently by a putative class of individuals who had
consumer debt and whose cases were resolved through binding arbitration, conducted
primarily by the National Arbitration Forum. See In re Nat'l Arbitration Forum Trade
Practices Litig., Civ. No. 09-1939, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15178, at *2-.5 (D. Minn. Feb.
22, 2010) (denying defendants' 12(b)(6) motion). Finally, the National Arbitration Forum
has been sued by a former employee alleging fraudulent and corrupt practices. Id. at 1
(referencing allegations in Richert v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum, Civ. No. 09-763, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 96160 (D. Minn. Oct. 13, 2009)).
47. Mollenkamnp et al., supra note 46, at A20.
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
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this Article will turn to the precedents upon which Caperton rests in order to
explore the point at which an arbitral institution could be deemed so biased that its
continued involvement as a decision-making body-or its failure to establish
structural protections from such potential bias-could also violate the Constitution.
There are many challenges in the approach taken in this Article. Chief
among them is the reality that arbitral institutions are generally private, rather than
public, dispute resolution bodies. Thus, it is problematic to apply the requirements
of the Constitution directly to them. Nonetheless, this Article and the risk-based
objective standard established in Caperton and its antecedents offer an important
approach to assessing the sufficiency of the impartiality offered by embedded
neutrals, particularly when they-or those providing them with access to
disputes-urge that such bodies should be treated as adequate replacements for
independent and public trial courts.
1. THE DICKENsTAN TALE OF CA PER TON v. A. T. MASSEY COAL CO.
The facts of Caperton v. A. T Massey Coal Co. ,5 as described by Justice
Kennedy in his majority opinion, are so essential 5 2 to understanding the Court's
decision to grant certiorari and to reverse the decision of West Virginia's highest
court that this Article will begin with a brief recapitulation. 5 3 In 1998, Hugh
Caperton, Harman Development Corporation, Harman Mining Corporation and
Sovereign Coal Sales ("Caperton") sued A.T. Massey Coal Co. and its affiliates
("Massey") in West Virginia state court for fraudulent misrepresentation,
concealment, and tortious interference with existing contractual relations.5 The
case went to trial before a jury. 55 On August 1, 2002, the jury found Massey liable
and awarded Caperton approximately $50 million in compensatory and punitive
damages.5 In post-trial motions filed soon afterwards in August 2002, Massey
challenged both the verdict and the damages award.5 Nearly three years later in
March 2005, the state trial court denied these motions, "finding that Massey
'intentionally acted in utter disregard of [Caperton's] rights and ultimately
destroyed [Caperton's] businesses because, after conducting cost-benefit analyses,
[Massey] concluded that it was in its financial interest to do so."' 58
51. Id.
52. The people and events involved also would seem to be the stuff of fiction,
not real life. Indeed, John Grisham has suggested that the events involved in this case served
as partial inspiration for his 2008 novel The Appeal. See Blake Fleetwood, The Best Judge
S3 Million Can Buy, HUFFINGTON POST, June 12, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/blake-fleetwood/the-best-judge-3 -million -b_-2 14639.html.
53. The corporate transactions, contract terms, governmental regulations, closing
of a Pittsburgh coke plant, Virginia lawsuit, and general pattern of strategic risk-taking that
preceded this lawsuit are described in some detail in Caperton v. A. T Massey Coal Co., No.
33350,2007 W. Va. LEXIS 119 (Nov. 21, 2007).
54. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
55. For a more complete description of the procedural history, see id at * 19..20.
56. Id. at *20.
57. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257. Massey had moved for judgment as a matter of
law, new trial or in the alternative, remittitur. Caperton, 2007 W. Va. LEXIS 119 at *5.
58. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
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Don Blankenship, Massey's chairman, CEO, and president, played a
central role in the events leading up to the West Virginia lawsuit and in the events
that led from the adverse jury verdict to the U.S. Supreme Court. 5 9 At some point
after the jury verdict in 2002 but before the denial of the company's post-trial
motions in 2005, Blankenship decided to lend financial support to Brent Benjamin,
a Charleston attorney 60seeking election to a seat on the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia, the state's highest court. The seat was held at that time by Justice
Warren McGraw. Blankenship made a direct contribution of $1000 to Benjamin's
campaign, the maximum permitted by statute.6 Much more significantly,
Blankenship contributed nearly $2.5 million to And For the Sake of the Kids, a
political organization that opposed McGraw and supported Benjamin. 62Further,
Blankenship spent a little more than $500,000 of his own money in direct support
of Benjamin, accomplished through mailings, letters soliciting donations, and
63
television and newspaper advertisements. I alBlankenship spent
approximately $3 million to support Benjamin's bid for a seat on the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
In his opinion on behalf of a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice
Kennedy64 chose to put these contributions into the following perspective:
59. Don Blankenship has been described as a "coal baron" who has proven to be
"tougher than bedrock" in his all-out battles with citizens, politicians, and regulators who
fear the environmental and health effects of King Coal's blasting of the state's
mountaintops. Michael Shnayerson, The Rape of Appalachia, VANITY FAIR, May 2006, at
140.
60. Mr. Benjamin, who is now Chief Justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals, had practiced civil litigation for twenty years in state and federal courts. His
specialty areas included toxic torts, complex litigation, and civil right litigation involving
the protection of children from physical and sexual abuse. See Justice Brent D. Benjamin,
http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/benjanmin.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
61. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257. West Virginia law provides:
No person may, directly or indirectly, make any contribution in excess of
the value of one thousand dollars in connection with any campaign for
nomination or election to or on behalf of any statewide office, in
connection with any other campaign for nomination or election to or on
behalf of any other elective office in the state or any of its subdivisions,
or in connection with or on behalf of any person engaged in furthering,
advancing, supporting or aiding the nomination or election of any
candidate for any of the offices.
W. VA. CODE § 3-8-12 (2009).
62. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
63. Id.
64. The choice of Justice Kennedy to write the majority opinion is interesting.
He has previously said: "The law makes a promise of neutrality. If the promise gets broken,
the law as we know it ceases to exist. All that's left is the dictate of a tyrant, or perhaps a
mob." Am. BAR Ass'N, STANDING COMM. ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS Vi (July 2001) (quoting J.
Anthony Kennedy, Speech at the ABA Symposium on Judicial Independence (Dec. 1998)),
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aba/abajudfinrpt072001.pdf, cited in James
Andrew Wynn & Eli Paul Mazur, Judicial Diversity: Where Independence and
Accountability Meet, 67 ALB. L. REv. 775, 778 (2004).
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Blankenship's donations accounted for more than two-thirds of the
total funds [And For the Sake of the Kids] raised . . .[and]
Blankenship's $3 million in contributions were more than the total
amount spent by all other Benjamin supporters and three times [or
300%] the amount spent by Benjamin's own committee. 65
In its brief to the Supreme Court, Caperton added that Blankenship's expenditures
on Benjamin's behalf were so large that they exceeded-by $1 million-"the total
amount spent by the campaign committees of both candidates combined.",66 There
is no doubt that Blankenship was committed to the success of Benjamin's
campaign.
In the general election held in 2004, Benjamin defeated McGraw 53.3%
to 46.7%, by a margin of 47,735 votes.6 Massey did not enter its appeal of the trial
court's adverse decision on the motion for judgment as a matter of law until
2006f.6 Nonetheless-and perhaps consistent with the history of strategic risk-
seeking demonstrated by both parties in the events leading up to this
case 69-Caperton moved to disqualify then-Justice Benjamin in October 2005,
relying on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the West
Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct. 70
In April 2006 ,' Justice Benjamin denied Caperton's motion for
disqualification.7 He observed that he had carefully reviewed Caperton's
submissions and found "no objective information" showing that he had a bias "for
or against any litigant[,], 73 that he had prejudged the case, or that he would be
"anything but fair and impartial."7  Finally, in October 2006, Massey filed its
petition for appeal to challenge the adverse jury verdict, and the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals granted review. Nearly another year passed before the
court announced its decision in November 2007 to reverse the $50 million verdict
against Massey. 75 It was a 3-2 decision. The majority consisted of Justice
Benjamin, along with then-Chief Justice Robin Davis and Justice Elliot Maynard.
The dissenters were Justices Larry Starcher and Joseph Albright. Interestingly, the
three judges in the majority found that Massey should have lost on substantive
grounds, stating that "Massey's conduct warranted the type of judgment rendered
65. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
66. Id.
67. Id
68. Apparently, there had been additional delays in the case due to difficulties
with the trial transcript. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 33350, 2007 W. Va.
LEXIS 119 at *20 n.20 (Nov. 21, 2007).
69. Id.
70. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
71. This was just a few months before the circuit court certified the trial
transcript, on August 23, 2006, with the appeal to the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals filed on October 24, 2006. See Caperton, 2007 W. Va. LEXIS 119, at *20 n.20.
72. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
73. Id. at 2258.
74. ld. at 2257-58.
75. Id. at 2258.
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in this case." 76 The reversal, however, was based on procedural grounds-"that a
forum-selection clause contained in a contract to which Massey was not a party
barred the suit in West Virginia and . .. that res judicata barred the suit due to an
out-of-state judgment to which Massey was not a party."77
Caperton sought rehearing, and both parties then moved for the
disqualification of selected justices. Justice Starcher had apparently made public
pronouncements criticizing Blankenship's role in the 2004 judicial elections. 7 8
Meanwhile, photos had appeared showing Blankenship and Justice May'nard
vacationing together in the French Riviera while the case was pending.7 9 The
motion for disqualification of Justice Benjamin rehashed the arguments that had
been made and rejected earlier. 80
Both Justices Starcher and Maynard granted the parties' recusal
81motions. In his recusal memorandum, Justice Starcher apparently reached out to
Justice Benjamin and observed that "Blankenship's bestowal of his personal
wealth, political tactics, and 'friendship' have created a cancer in the affairs of this
Court.",82 Justice Benjamin either did not read his colleague's memorandum or was
not persuaded by its analysis. He denied Caperton's recusal motion. 8
76. Id.
77. Id. These procedural decisions may deserve study all by themselves.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id
81. Id.
82. Order of Justice Starcher Regarding Recusal at 8, Caperton v. A. T. Massey
Coal Co., No. 33350, 2007 W. Va. LEXIS 119 (Nov. 21, 2007) [hereinafter Starcher
Recusal Memorandum]. Justice Starcher added:
And I have seen that cancer grow and grow, in ways that I may not fully
disclose at this time. At this point, I believe that my stepping aside in the
instant case might be a step in treating that cancer-but only if others as
well rise to the challenge. If they do not, then I shudder to think of the
cynicism and disgust that the lawyers, judges, and citizens of this
wonderful State will feel about our justice system.
Id. at 9. Clearly, this controversy had become personal and painful. Justice Starcher
observed, for example, that Mr. Blankenship had "sported a 'Get Starcher' ball cap
announcing me as his 'next target' as he publicly celebrated spending millions to influence
elections in our State," id. at 3, and that
this type of "big money" . .. has been and continues to be directed at
wounding our State's judiciary with false claims portraying West
Virginia as a 'judicial hellhole," false claims that facts do not support
and false claims that have been refuted by academic researchers at West
Virginia University. These claims are simply false, but truth and
accuracy mean nothing to people who want to skew the justice system in
their favor.
Id. at 7-8.
83. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258. Justice Benjamin's 2008 concurring opinion
does not indicate whether he was aware of the magnitude of Blankenship's campaign
contributions at the time they were made. Id. at 2259. The question is whether Justice
Benjamin should have known or was required to conduct an investigation of some sort.
Such obligations are imposed in other contexts. See, for example, FED. R. Civ. P. I11(b),
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In the subsequent rehearing, Justice Benjamin served in the capacity of
acting chief justice 84and thus was responsible for selecting two new justices to
replace the recused justices. During this time, he also denied a third recusal
motion, in which Caperton argued that recusal was required under West Virginia
law and introduced new evidence: "a public opinion poll indicating that over 67%
of West Virginians doubted Justice Benjamin would be fair and impartial."85
Justice Benjamin again refused to withdraw, attacking the credibility of the poll. 8 6
Another few months passed and in April 2008, the court again issued a
3-2 decision and again based its decision on the two procedural grounds described
above. 8 7 Justices Benjamin and Davis were again in the majority, joined by one of
the newly assigned justices. 8 8 Justices Albright and Cookman dissented, observing:
"Not only is the majority opinion unsupported by the facts and existing case law,
but it is also fundamentally unfair. Sadly, justice was neither honored nor served
by the majority."89 A month after Caperton filed its petition for writ of certiorari
with the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Benjamin filed a concurring opinion which
included a defense of his decision not to recuse himself. 90 He relied, as he had
previously, on Caperton's failure to show that he had a "'direct, personal,
substantial, pecuniary interest' in this case." 9' Further, Justice Benjamin asserted
that "[a]dopting 'a standard merely of "appearances" . . . seems little more than an
invitation to subject West Virginia's justice system to the vagaries of the day-a
framework in which predictability and stability yield to supposition, innuendo,
half-truths, and partisan manipulations."' 92
A. The Court's Analysis in Caperton
The issue before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether a justice who was
in the majority in a 3-2 decision to reverse a jury verdict of $50 million violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when he denied a recusal
motion based on his direct and indirect receipt of "campaign contributions in an
extraordinary amount from, and through the efforts of the board chairman and
requiring lawyers' certification that "to the best of [their] knowledge, information, and
belief formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances[,]" pleadings, written
motions and other papers meet certain requirements.
84. Justice Starcher's recusal memorandum indicated that there had been a
recent vote "to remove two justices from the Chief Justice rotation order, materially
affecting the appointment of replacement judges in cases involving Mr. Blankenship's
companies" and that Justice Benjamin had been one of the judges voting in favor of that
removal. Starcher Recusal Memorandum, supra note 82, at 4.
85. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 284 (W. Va.
2008) (Albright & Cookman, JJ., dissenting)).
90. Id. at 2259.
91. Id. (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 295 (W. Va.
2008)).
92. Id. (quoting Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 306).
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principal officer of the corporation found liable for the damages." 93 Finding that
"there are objective standards that require recusal when 'the probability of actual
bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally
tolerable[J"..9 4 a majority of the Court found that Justice Benjamin's refusal to
recuse himself had indeed violated the Due Process Clause.
It must be noted that the Supreme Court's decision was based only on a
violation of the Due Process Clause, not on a violation of the West Virginia Code
of Judicial Conduct. 9 5 And throughout his opinion, Justice Kennedy made it clear
that the Supreme Court's determination of a constitutional violation was required
by the "extreme facts" 96 of the case that pushed the "probability of actual bias"97 to
"an unconstitutional level." 98 We can thus infer that with less extreme facts, a
majority of the Supreme Court would have left the matter to be remedied by the
West Virginia Legislature, which could have taken legislative action after noticing
that the state's highest court refused to find a violation of the West Virginia Code
of Judicial Conduct. It appears, perhaps significantly, that the West Virginia
Legislature had not taken such action despite the many opportunities presented by
the excruciatingly slow unfolding of events in this case. 9 9
Justice Kennedy's opinion returns repeatedly to the need to determine
whether recusal was required in this case as an "objective matter." 00 If a judge has
a "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest," this clearly violates the
objective standard.1' 1 But Caperton's innovation comes in finding that admittedly
legal campaign contributions can nonetheless create "circumstances 'in which
experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or
decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.""10 2 Precedent revealed
two types of circumstances that present this grave danger. First, the individual
judge can share such a strong identity of interest with an organization that his
93. Id. at 2256-57.
94. Id. at 2257 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 412 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
95. Id at 2267.
96. Id. at 2265-66.
97. Id. at 2259, 2262, 2265.
98. Id. at 2265.
99. Before the Supreme Court announced its decision in Caperton, there were
proposals for judicial election reform in West Virginia. See John O'Brien, Public Financing
of W Va. Election to be Weighed in Legislature, LEGAL NEWSLINE.COM, Mar. 8, 2009,
http://www.legalnewsline.corn/news/2 19689-public-financing-of-w.va.-election-to-be-
weighed-in-legislature. The Governor's Office announced plans to study judicial reform,
however, and requested suspension of legislative efforts. See Walt Williams, Governor's
Opposition Slows Public Financing Bill, ST. J., Apr. 2, 2009, available at
http://statejournal.com/story.cfm?func=viewstory&storyid=55763. To date, there have not
been any changes to the procedures or standards governing judicial recusal or to judicial
elections in the state. See N.Y. UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW: BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 2009
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION INITIATIVES IN THE STATES (Jan. 20, 2010) and 2009 JUDICIAL
SELECTION IN THE STATES (Jan. 20, 2009),
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resourcelstatejudicial reform-efforts_2009/.
100. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259.
101. Id
102. Id. at 2257 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 412 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
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concern for the financial well-being of the organization is likely to "affect [his]
judgment." 03 Second, the judge may have been so personally offended or affected
by his interaction with a party in a prior, private proceeding that it will be "difficult
if not impossible ... to free himself from the influence of what took plc"'04 in
that prior proceeding. In both of these instances, the risk is too great that the judge
will be unable to maintain the detachment needed to be sufficiently independent
and impartial to provide a process that avoids violating the Due Process Clause.'105
The language of Tumey v. Ohio,10 6 quoted in Caperton, is particularly evocative
here:
Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation
to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required
to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused,
denies the latter due process of law.'107
Justice Kennedy put his own gloss on the test enunciated in Tumey by
explaining it in the contemporary language of risk management' 0 8 : "The Court
asks not whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average
judge in his position is 'likely' to be neutral, or whether there is an
unconstitutional 'potential for bias."" 09 Elsewhere, he wrote: "In defining these
standards the Court has asked whether, 'under a realistic appraisal of psychological
tendencies and human weaknesses,' the interest 'poses such a risk of actual bias or
103. Id. at 2260 (citing Tumney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).
104. Id. at 2261 (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 138 (1955)).
105. See Wynn & Mazur, supra note 59, at 778 (observing that "judicial
independence is predicated on a neutralizing distance between the judge and the legal
dispute").
106. 273 U.S. 510.
107. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2260 (citing Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532) (emphasis
added).
108. Risk analysis, which is dependent upon probability assessments and
psychological factors, is a staple of decision-making and dispute resolution literature and
practice. See, e.g., Marjorie Aaron, For the General Practioner: Dispute Resolutions: Do's
and Don 'ts for Mediation, GP SOLO, Mar. 2006, at 30; John Bronsteen, Some Thoughts
About the Economics of Settlement, 78 FORDHAm L. REv. 1129, 1138 (2009) (surveying
research regarding the factors that trigger risk-averse and risk-seeking behavior in
considering settlement); Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97
Nw. U. L. R-Ev. 1115, 1116-17 (2003) (explaining prospect theory, analyzing its use in the
legal field, and concluding that the theory is a valuable tool in analyzing legal issues); Jason
S. Johnston, Paradoxes of the Safe Society: A Rational Actor Approach to the
Reconceptualization of Risk and the Reformation of Risk Regulation, 151 U. PENN. L. Rev.
747, 768, 780 (2003) (examining the "phenomenon of increasingly widespread and yet
increasingly consequence-free risk taking" in the U.S. and suggesting the establishment of
"1regulatory populism"); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis
of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 274 (1979); Jeffrey Senger, Decision
Analysis in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REv. 723 (2004).
109. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2262.
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prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is
to be adequately implemented.""'10
The challenge was then to apply these precedents to the facts of
Caperton, involving the influence of money in judicial elections. Repeatedly
referring to Caperton's facts as "exceptional," Justice Kennedy examined the
"relative size"''' of Blankenship's (and Massey's) contributions to Justice
Benjamin's campaign and the "apparent effect"' 12 -as distinct from the actual,
provable effect-such contributions had on the election results. Though $3 million
may seem a small amount to invest in order to save $50 million, Blankenship's
donations dwarfed the monies that were contributed by others interested in this
judicial campaign." 3 Justice Kennedy also acknowledged that other events may
have played a role in Benjamin's electoral victory,' 14 but nonetheless concluded
that "Blankenship's campaign contributions-in comparison to the total amount
contributed to the campaign, as well as the total amount spent in the election-had
a significant and disproportionate influence on the electoral outcome."" 5 The risk
that Blankenship's influence engendered actual bias was sufficiently substantial
that it "must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately
implemented."' 1 6
Justice Kennedy then examined the "temporal relationship" 7 between the
campaign contributions, the justice's election, and the pendency of Massey's
apel.'1 He concluded that it was "reasonably foreseeable" to Blankenship
when he made his donations that the appeal of the $50 million judgment against
110. Id. at 2263 (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 412 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). Chris Guthrie
and Jeff Rachlinski have written many articles examining the cognitive and other biases that
affect judicial decision-making. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeff-rey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J.
Wistrich, The "Hidden Judiciary ": An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice,
58 DUKE L.J 1477 (2009); Jeff-rey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect
Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinski &
Andrew Wistrich, Blinking On the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
1 (2007); Chris Guthrie, Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 420 (2007); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris
Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Bankruptcy Judge's Mind, 86 B.U. L. REv. 1227
(2006); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics, Biases, and Governance, in BLACKWELL
HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 567 (Derek J. Koehler & Nigel Harvey
eds., 2004); see also Richard P. Larrick, Debiasing, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 567 (Derek J. Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2004).
Ill. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2264.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2257
114. Id. at 2264.
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting Withrow, 412 U.S. at 47).
117. Justice Kennedy uses very interesting phrasing here. "Temporal" evokes
both relatively simple issues of timing and the much more complex matter of
acknowledging human beings' earthly, non-divine natures. See Merriam- Webster's Online
Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/netdict/temporal (last visited Mar. 12, 2010)
(defining "temporal" as "of or relating to tume as opposed to eternity," "of or relating to
earthly life, ". .lay or secular rather than clerical or sacred").
118. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2264.
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his company would ultimately end up before Justice Benjamin. 119 Under these
circumstances:
Although there is no allegation of a quid pro quo agreement, the fact
remains that Blankenship's extraordinary contributions were made
at a time when he had a vested stake in the outcome. Just as no man
is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, similar fears of bias can
arise when-without the consent of the other parties-a man
chooses the judge in his own cause. And applying this principle to
the judicial election process, there was here a serious, objective risk
of actual bias that required Justice Benjamin's recusal. 120
Both the objectively significant and comparatively disproportionate size
of Blarnkenship's contributions, along with the worrisome "temporal relationship"
suggested by the timing of these contributions, the election, the appeal and its
results signaled an unconstitutional potential for bias. A majority of the Justices of
the Supreme Court concluded that this case represented a situation in which an
average judge-who, despite his or her ceremonial robe,'12' is a human being just
like the rest of us122 _would be unconstitutionally tempted "not to hold the balance
nice, clear and true."123
It is notable that four Justices dissented. This Article will not examine
their reasoning in any detail. In a sense, however, both the majority and two
dissenting opinions seem to be indirect responses to the many criticisms and
expectations directed at individual judges and the judicial branch in general within
the past decade. 124 Indeed, all three opinions suggest that the Justices agree that the
119. Id. at 2264-65.
120. Id. at 2265.
121. Which is meant to symbolize and remind the wearer of his or her obligation
to live up to his or her sacred role and duties. See, e.g., Raymond Daniell, Elizabeth HI
Crowned in Abbey; Millions Cheer Parade in Rain; Ruler Bids Subjects
Look Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1953, available at http://www.nytimes.comlleaming/
generallonthisday/big/0602.htnml ("The ceremony of coronation, anachronistic as it may
seem, harking back to the symbols of an age that is dead and gone, is an important factor in
holding the heterogeneous British family of nations together. It stems from ancient
superstitions and belief in the magic properties and symbolism of what Broadway would
call 'props' but the fact is that it works.").
122. Literature and music are filled with tales of temptation. Usually, the devil
seems to win-but perhaps that is because tales of forbearance are not nearly as interesting.
Compare, for example, the Bible's depiction of the Devil's temptation of Jesus in the desert
with Goethe's Faust, Charlie Daniels' The Devil Went Down to Georgia, and Robert
Johnson's Crossroads Blues. Matthew 4: 1-11; Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust: Part
One (David Luke trans., Penguin 1998) (1808); CHARLIE DANIELS, The Devil Went Down to
Georgia, on MILLION MILE REFLECTIONS (Epic 1979); ROBERT JOH-NSON, Crossroad Blues,
on THE COMPLETE RECORDINGS (Columbia 1990) (1937).
123. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2264 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532
(1927)).
124. See THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT & DISABILITY ACT STUDY COMM.,
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980: A REPORT TO
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 1 (2006) (noting that the Chief Justice Rehnquist had established the
Committee, with Justice Breyer as its Chair, to look into the implementation of the Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 as a result of recent criticism from Congress regarding
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institution of the judiciary is in danger of losing its legitimacy or standing and thus
requires some form of protection. The Justices' disagreement involved their
differing assessments of the best means to achieve that protection. Instead of
recognizing a constitutionally significant, judicially cognizable harm, the
dissenters would have accomplished this goal by forcing Caperton to either live
with the court's result or seek help from the West Virginia Legislature or
Governor. 12 5 (Another option, not mentioned by the dissenters but certainly
encouraged by the Supreme Court's arbitral jurisprudence, is that Caperton and
those in a similar position should elect to opt out of the judicial system for the
resolution of future contentious disputes.) In contrast, the majority concluded that
the best protection for the judiciary was to require an individual judge to bear the
consequences of his tone deaf decisions and swallow the bitter tonic of a public
(though relatively gentle) rebuke. The majority did not declare Caperton the
winner in this contest. It simply reversed and remanded to give Caperton the
chance to have his appeal heard one more time by a panel of the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals that did not include Justice Benjamin., 2 6 Presumably,
this decision might also have provided Caperton and Massey with the opportunity
to reach a mutually agreeable settlement, though that is not what actually happened
when the case returned to West Virginia. 2
11. THE RISE AND PERCEIVED EFFECTS OF THE EMBEDDED
NEUTRAL IN THE ARBITRATION CONTEXT
It is now time to turn from judges to the embedded neutrals who produce
outcomes in administrative adjudication, arbitration, and mediation and explore the
data that have developed regarding one-time players' perceptions of the fairness of
the procedures that these neutrals oversee or facilitate. These perceptions and their
implications will help to explain why there is a need to do more to manage the use
of embedded neutrals. They also establish the need to explore the question of
whether Caperton's reasoning-particularly its establishment of a constitutional,
objective standard based on "a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and
the handling of allegations of judicial misconduct within the federal judiciary).
125. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2268-69 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("States are, of
course, free to adopt broader recusal rules than the Constitution requires ... ); see also id.
at 2275 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The relevant question, however, is whether we do more
good than harm by seeking to correct this imperfection through expansion of our
constitutional mandate in a manner ungoverned by anydiscemnable rule.").
126. Id. at 2267 (remanding to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals for
proceedings not inconsistent with the majority opinion).
127. On November 12, 2009, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals again
determined that the state circuit court had erred in denying Massey's motion to dismiss,
based on the existence of a forum selection clause in a contract that "directly related to the
conflict giving rise to the instant lawsuit." Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 33350,
2009 W. Va. LEXIS 107 ( Sept 8, 2009). Despite winning before the U.S. Supreme Court,
Hugh Caperton lost again in West Virginia. He has since filed a petition for rehearing. See
Jeffrey V. Mehalic, Caperton Files Petition for Rehearing with
WV Supreme Court, W. VA. Bus. LITIG., Dec. 2, 2009,
http://www.wvbusinesslitigationblog.com/2009/1 2/articles/appellate-decisions/caperton-
files-petition-for-rehearing-with-wv-supreme-court.
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human weaknesses"12 8 and contemporary principles of risk management-might
be applied to NAF and its arbitrators.
Dispute resolution processes that were once viewed as "alternative" are now
ubiquitous in American life. In disputes with agencies, courts now reqjuire citizens
to exhaust administrative procedures before they may file a lawsuit.' 12The courts
also grant substantial deference to the decisions of administrative adjudicators.' 3 0
Similarly, courts enforce mandatory arbitration clauses in a wide variety of
boilerplate contracts. When consumers buy computers or cell phones, receive a
credit card, or even enter into a contract to receive professional services,'13 ' they
will often find that any disputes that arise must be resolved through arbitration.
Based primarily on the language of the Federal Arbitration Act,' 3 2 courts generally
are more deferential to the decisions of arbitrators than they are to administrative
adjudicators. 13 3 Courts are now beginning to enforce mediation clauses-between
employers and employees' 3 4  and between corporate purchasers and
128. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2264.
129. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006) ("Agency action made reviewable by statute and
final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to
judicial review."); see also Silverton Snowmobile Club v. U.S. Forest Sewv., 433 F.3d 772
(10th Cir. 2006) (holding that the appellate court did not have jurisdiction because the
Silverton Snowmobile Club did not exhaust their administrative remedies); Raoul Berger,
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 48 YALE L. J. 981, 1006 (1938) ("Administrative
remedies must be exhausted before resort is had to the federal courts."); 2 Am. JUR. 2D
Administrative Law § 474 (2010). But see Rebecca L. Donnellan, The Exhaustion Doctrine
Should Not Be a Doctrine with Exceptions, 103 W. VA. L. REv. 361 (2001) (describing
exceptions to the exhaustion requirement, including where resort to those remedies may
prejudice a subsequent judicial challenge of the agency action, the agency's remedy may be
inadequate, an administrative remedy would be inadequate because the administrative
agency is shown to be biased or to have otherwise predetermined the issues before it, or
administrative remedies would be futile).
130. 5 U. S.C. § 706(2) (2006). But see Garry, supra note 40.
131. See, e.g., D.C. Bar, Ethics Op. 218 (2001), available at
http://www.dcbar.org/for lawyers/ethics/legal ethics/opinions/opinion2l18.cfm.
132. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006).
133. In addition to the grounds for vacatur provided directly in the FAA, three
common law grounds have developed: manifest disregard of the law, arbitrary or capricious
or irrational, and violation of public policy. The status of manifest disregard is somewhat
unclear. See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008) (calling "manifest
disregard" into question by stating that it may not be new grounds for review but a way to
refer to all of standards collectively); Bosack v. Soward, 573 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 2009)
("Arbitrators exceed their powers when they express a 'manifest disregard of law,' or when
they issue an award that is 'completely irrational."'); see also Michael H. LeRoy, Crowning
the New King: The Statutory Arbitrator and the Demise of Judicial Review, 2009 J. Disp.
RESOL. 1, 34-40 (observing that appellate courts vacate trial court decisions three times
more often than they vacate arbitral awards; also noting different levels of deference
extended to employee wins versus employer wins in arbitration as well as arbitral awards in
Title VII matters versus breach of contract cases).
134. See Jason Schatz, Imposing Mandatory Mediation of Public Employment
Disputes in New Jersey to Ameliorate an Impending Fiscal Crisis, 57 RUTGERs L. REv.
1111, 1124 (2005) (noting that voluntary mediation programs sponsored by employers have
been deemed enforceable).
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selr' 35 _with analyses that are similar to those they have used for arbitration
clauses. With some instructive exceptions,' 3 6 courts also generally seem ready to
defer to the mediators who have brokered settlement agreements, regardless of
whether the mediations were conducted as part of a court-connected mediation
program'3 or on an ad hoc, private basis.'3
A worrisome percentage of these examples involve uneven contests. On
one side is the individual, one-time player. On the other side is the institutional,
repeat player. As is true in traditional litigation, the repeat player often is more
powerful, with greater access to resources and more familiarity with these types of
disputes and the procedures to resolve them. What is new-or perhaps, more
accurately, what is a modem variation of a dynamic that is very, very old, 3 9 -is
courts' support for the control exerted by institutional repeat players over the
selection of the organization that will provide the dispute resolution services, the
procedures that will be used, and the criteria that will be used to determine the pool
of neutrals who will decide cases or facilitate their resolution .'14 0
135. See, e.g., Gate Precast Co. v. Kenwood Towne Place, LLC, 2009 WL
3614931 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 28, 2009) (ordering mediation pursuant to clause).
136. See, e.g., Valchine v. Valchine, 793 So.2d 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2 00 1).
137. See Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-
Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REv. 1 (2001).
138. See James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic
Look at Litigation About Mediation, 11I HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 43, 73, 75 (2006) (describing
research conducted on mediation litigation cases from 1999-2003, which revealed that
courts enforced disputed mediated agreements in 62% of cases; also noting that courts in
California use public judicial powers to resolve private disputes in an ad hoc manner,
although the majority of the resulting opinions emanating from these disputes are
unpublished, and California courts do not allow parties to cite or rely on unpublished
opinions; as a result, most of the jurisprudence in the mediation process comes from the
private arena); James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Mediation Litigation Trends: 1999-
2007, 1 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION Rrv. 395, 403-05 (observing that nearly half of the
opinions in the mediation litigation database involved challenges to the enforcement of
mediated settlements, courts enforced 62% of the cases, and that the traditional contract
defenses of fraud, mistake, duress, or undue influence were unlikely to be successful).
139. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359, 1387-88, 1391 (1985)
(stating ADR does little to counter historical and subconscious prejudice, and arguing
judicial system should be used to encourage fairness and deter prejudice because such
systems are formal, subject to more control, and can reduce prejudice); Owen M. Fiss,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (arguing ADR should not be allowed
because parties are often coerced to settle and absence of judicial involvement raises various
concerns); Tina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE
L.J. 1545, 1549-50 (1991) (opposing mandatory family mediation because it requires
parties to interact in forced setting, women often feel obliged to maintain connection with
ex-partner during process, and it is potentially destructive because parties were once
involved in intimate relationship); see also Symposium, Against Settlement: Twenty-Five
Years Later, 78 FORDHAm L. Rnv. 1117 (2009).
140. Such control has the potential to reduce the diversity of the pool. See Carla
D. Pratt, Way to Represent: The Role of Black Lawyers in Contemporary American
Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 1409, 1433 (2009) (noting the importance of including
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Commentators have increasingly used these concerns to attack mandatory
arbitration of consumer, employment, franchise, securities, civil rights, and nursing
home disputes as unfair.'14'1 A couple of years ago, the non-profit organization
Public Citizen released a report14 2 that was based on California data detailing
credit-card companies' nearly 95% win rates in mandatory arbitrations.'14 3 Public
Citizen asserted that these favorable rates were the result of cozy relationships
between arbitral firms and credit-card companies.'" To bolster its charges, Public
Citizen highlighted some arbitral firms' reliance upon referrals from particular
credit-card companies for the majority of their cases, the large fees paid by some
credit-card companies to these firms, and the large numbers of cases handled by a
small number of individual arbitrators. 14 For example, Public Citizen reported that
during the period from January 1, 2003, through March 31, 2007, 53% of the
nearly 34,000 cases handled by NAF in California involved holders of MBNA
credit cards.'14 6 Between January 1998 and November 1999, NAF had received
$5.3 million from just one credit-card company, First USA.14 7 And between
January 1, 2003, and March 31, 2007, NAF's ten busiest arbitrators heard between
699 and 1332 of the credit-card cases.'14 8 Public Citizen also reported the
experience of one NAF arbitrator, Harvard Law School Professor Elizabeth
Bartholet, who stopped receiving referrals from NAF after she awarded $48,000 to
a consumer on his counterclaim against the credit-card company suing for
collection.14 9 Professor Bartholet subsequently resigned in protest.' 50
black lawyers because they can serve as representatives and provide "connective links"
between black citizens and predominantly white institutions).
141. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Mandating Minimum Quality, supra note 28, at 399
n.38 (listing several articles that object to the phenomenon of "mass arbitration").
142. See PUBLIC CITIZEN, How CREDIT CARD COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS
(Sept. 2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7545.
143. See id. at 2 (specify'ing win rate of 94.7%). But see SEARLE ARBITRATION
REPORT, supra note 38, at xiii (reporting that in actions that consumers filed in AAA
consumer arbitrations, consumers won some relief 53.3% of the time and business
claimants-likely not limited to only credit-card companies-won some relief 83.5% of the
time; also reporting some evidence of a repeat-player effect but suggesting that this
reflected repeat players' better understanding of when to settle prior to the arbitration); see
also Sarah Rudolph Cole & Theodore H. Frank, The Current State of Consumer Arbitration,
15 Disp. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2008, at 30, 31 (citing Hillard M. Sterling & Philip G. Schrag,
Default Judgments Against Consumers: Has the System Failed?, 67 DENy. U. L. REv. 357
(1990)) (observing that in collection cases, the consumer almost certainly owes the debt and
that this explains credit-card companies' high win rates in both arbitrations and traditionally
litigated cases); Matthew C. McDonald & Kirkland E. Reid, Arbitration Opponents Barking
Up Wrong Branch, 52 ALA. LAW. 56,60 (2001)).
144. PUBLIC CrIZEtN, supra note 142, at 4.
145. Id. at 13-27.
146. Id. at 14.
147. See id.
148. Id. atl16.
149. Id. at 17, 30-3 1.
150. See PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 142, at 3 1. Richard Neely, former justice on
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, also served as an NAF arbitrator. Observing
that NAF provided its arbitrators with a judgment form that was already completed and
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Public Citizen's analysis of the data certainly was catalytic, provoking
responses from academics and public policy analysts defending the overall
integrity of arbitration. While admitting the existence of some problems with
consumer arbitration, for example, Professor Sarah Cole and colleagues pointed
out that most of the cases included in Public Citizen's analysis were collections
cases, in which the consumer almost certainly owed the amount claimed.' 5' They
also noted that a high percentage of these cases result in default judgments and that
the "win rate" for credit-card companies in arbitration mirrored their success rate
in collections actions in court.' 52 Meanwhile, Professor Cole and her colleagues
observed that consumers benefited from the quick dispositions produced by
arbitration.153
The Searle Civil Justice Institute' 5 4 specifically commissioned a Task
Force on Consumer Arbitration to study consumer arbitrations administered by the
American Arbitration Association. The Task Force, which was led by Professor
Christopher Drahozal, produced a preliminary report in March 2009 .155 Though the
sample size was relatively small (301 files) and had other acknowledged
limitations, the Task Force found that when consumers were claimants, they won
some relief 53.3% of the time, while business claimants won some relief 83.6% of
the time.'15 6 The latter category was likely dominated by debt-collection cases,
which as noted above, tend to result in awards for the business. The Task Force's
close analysis of the award amounts, meanwhile, produced the interesting result
that "[iln 41 of the 51 cases in which a business claimant prevailed, the business
recovered between 90.0% and 100.0% of the amount claimed" while "I[iln the 119
cases in which consumer claimants received monetary awards, the consumer
recovered 20.0% or less of the amount claimed in 36 cases and between 90.0% and
100.0% of the amount claimed in 37 cases."15 7 Finally, while the Task Force found
required consumers to pay arbitration fees that were substantially higher than court fees,
Neely concluded that "[glodless bloodsucking banks have converted apparently neutral
arbitration forums into collection agencies to exact the last drop of blood from desperate
debtors." Richard Neely, Arbitration and the Godless Bloodsuckers, W. VA. LAW., Sept.-
Oct. 2006, at 12, 12.
151. Cole &Frank, supra note 143, at 31.
152. Id at 31. Professor Cole and Mr. Frank also noted that Public Citizen had
studied only those cases that went to arbitration, thus removing from their sample the cases
that creditors decided to dismiss before the selection of an arbitrator, and did not
acknowledge consumers' success in achieving reductions in the amount owed. Id. at 31-32.
Their article also summarizes relevant findings from several other studies. See Sarah R.
Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Empirical Research on Consumer Arbitration: What the Data
Reveals, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1051, 1058-59 (2009) (profiling NAF arbitrator Jonathan
Krotinger who discounted awards by approximately 30% yet continued to receive a large
number of referrals from NAF).
153. See Cole & Blankley, supra note 136, at 1072-73.
154. Established in 2008 as a division of the Searle Center on Law, Regulation
and Economic Growth at Northwestern University School of Law.
155. SEARLE ARBITRATION REPORT, supra note 38.
156. Idat 67-68.
157. Id. at 70 (observing that this "bimodal" pattern of relatively clear winners
and losers is consistent with studies of AAA commercial arbitration awards and
international arbitration awards).
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support for the existence of a repeat-player advantage in terms of "win rates," the
evidence further suggested that this discrepancy was due to effective case
screening by repeat businesses rather than arbitrator bias.'158
In the employment arbitration context, researchers similarly have found
that employees win less frequently than employers in arbitrations conducted
pursuant to mandatory arbitration provisions inserted by employers in personnel
manuals or handbooks. 59 Employees' likelihood of winning is even weaker when
their employers are repeat players; their odds are worst of all when their employers
have used the same arbitrator more than once.'160 Professor Alexander Colvin
reviewed the California data to determine the results of employment arbitrations
conducted by AAA arbitrators pursuant to mandatory arbitration clauses in
employer-promulgated agreements. He found that employees won only 19.7% of
these cases'16' and were even less successful when their employers were repeat
players, then winning only 13.9% of the time.' 62 Employees fared better when their
employers were also one-time players, winning 32% of these cases. 13Professor
Colvin also found cases involving repeat-player employers who had used the same
arbitrator more than once. Employees had the worst odds in these cases, winning
only 11.3% of the time.164 Like Public Citizen, Professor Colvin also considered
the income received by employment arbitrators. He found that while the mean
arbitral award for employees was $23,233 165 (reflecting the many cases in which
no damages were awarded to the employee), the mean arbitrator fee was a fairly
substantial $ 10,351 166 in cases involving a hearing and award, regardless of
whether the employee was awarded damages.
158. See id. at 76-82.
159. But see Richard A. Bales & Jason N.W. Plowman, Compulsory Arbitration
as Part of a Broader Employment Dispute Resolution Process: The Anheuser-Busch
Example, 26 HOFSTR-A LAB. & EMP. LTJ 1 (2008) (describing the Anheuser-Busch dispute
resolution program as reasonably fair, though also admitting a lack of comparative data
regarding outcomes or perceptual data from employees who have used the program); Lisa
B. Bingham, An Overview of Employment Arbitration in the United States: Law, Public
Policy and Data, N.Z. J. INDUS. REL., June 1998, at 5, 11-12, cited in Alexander J.S. Colvin,
Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11I
EMP. Rrs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 405, 412-13 (2007) (observing that these were predominantly
claims brought by managers or executives under individually-negotiated contracts).
160. Colvin, supra note 159, at 414-15 (describing other studies that found a
lower win rate for employees in claims based on employee handbooks rather than
individually-negotiated contracts).
161. Colvin, supra note 159, at 418. In contrast, employees arbitrating as a result
of individually negotiated contracts do quite well. In one study, they won 68.8% of the time.
In another, they won 61.3% of their cases. The employees arbitrating pursuant to
individually negotiated contracts tend to be highly paid managers and executives. The
employees arbitrating pursuant to personnel manuals or handbooks are likely to be lower-
paid and lower-ranking employees. See id at 413-14.
162. See id. at 430.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id. at 433.
166. See id. at 425.
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Importantly, in the employment arbitration context, commentators
continue to debate whether mandatory arbitration produces significantly different
results from courts. Researchers have been unable to find such a difference when
comparing higher-paid employees' claims.16 7 On the other hand, they have
uncovered disparity when comparing lower-paid employees' claims. 168 It is
possible that because employment arbitration is often free, more of these lower-
paid employees choose to use the process, even for fivolous claims.' 6This could
explain the lower-paid employees' low win rate. In some instances, it appears that
the employers who have adopted employment arbitration have also
institutionalized other dispute resolution processes that screen out the strongest
cases, leaving only the weakest to proceed to arbitration.' 7 0 Another possibility,
which also has empirical support, is that employers who have suffered defeat in
litigation-or avoided such defeat by agreeing to a settlement' 7 '-have changed
their procedures in order to reduce the likelihood of future litigation. Despite all of
these potential explanations for lower-paid employees' experience in employment
arbitration, it is also possible that employer-mandated employment arbitration has
developed a structure that works to the disadvantage of employees. And it is
almost certain that the numbers uncovered by Professor Colvin provided additional
ammunition to critics of employment arbitration skeptical of the impartiality of a
mandatory, employer-controlled process that delivers low employee win rates and
low damage awards.'17 2
167. Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of
Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, Disp. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003-Jan. 2003, at
44.
168. See Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, supra note 28, at 1287-
99 (reporting the results of the Eisenberg and Hill study, supra note 167). But see Michael
Delikat & Morris M. Kleiner, Comparing Litigation and Arbitration of Employment
Disputes: Do Plaint iffs Better Vindicate Their Rights in Litigation?, Am. BAR Ass'N. LiTiG.
SEC. CONFLICT MGMT., Winter 2003, at 11.
169. See Colvin, supra note 142, at 419.
170. See Lisa B. Bingham & Shimon Sarraf, Employment Arbitration Before and
After the Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising
Out of Employment: Preliminary Evidence that Self-Regulation Makes a Difference, in
ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF THlE NEW
YORK UNIVERSITY 53PD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 303, 323, tbl.2 (Samuel Estreicher
& David Sherwyn eds., 2004); Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum
at Low Cost, Disp. RESOL. J., May/July 2003, at 9; Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost:
An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American
Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 777, 807-08 (2003).
171. See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Why Suppose? Let's Find Out: A Public Policy
Research Program on Dispute Resolution, 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 101, 112-13 (explaining
that USPS national mediation program was part of the settlement of a racial discrimination
class action). USPS managers report that they have improved in their ability to deal with
issues with their employees, primarily by being more willing to listen. See Jonathan F.
Anderson & Lisa Bingham, Upstream Effects from Mediation of Workplace Disputes: Some
Preliminary Evidence from the USPS, 48 LAB. L.J. 601, 607-08 (1997).
172. Although he also has referenced similar data, Professor David Schwartz
urges that the data ultimately do not matter in determining whether or not mandatory
arbitration is fair. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, supra note 24, at 1340-
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In the securities arbitration area, as well, there has been cause for concern
for consumers (or customers). Evidence indicates that customers' win rates have
declined, as have their recovery rates. 173 Customers fare particularly poorly when
facing large brokerage firms or when their arbitrators are attorneys who represent
brokerage firms or brokers in other arbitrations.'174 Research also has shown that
the selection of pro-industry arbitrators has increased.'17 5
Within this area, however, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FfNJRA)'17 6 and the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA) have
been admirably proactive. In a report commissioned by SICA, Professors Jill
Gross and Barbara Black described perceptions of arbitral partiality among
customers.'1 7 Even though a strong majority of customers and "non-customers"
(i.e., primarily industry representatives) responding to a survey perceived that their
arbitration panels were competent to resolve the disputes before them,' 7 8 the
research also revealed significant divergences between customers and
non-customers in securities arbitration.'17 9 Customers were much less likely than
non-customers to perceive the arbitration panel as open-minded (28% vs. 49%),8O
much less likely to perceive the arbitration panel as impartial (25% vs. 4%,1
and, ultimately, much less likely to view the arbitration process as fair (27.84% vs.
50.64%).' 812 Indeed, 60% of customers disagreed with the statement "I have a
favorable view of securities arbitration for customer disputes,"18 3 and 61%
disagreed with the statement that "[a]rbitration was fair for all parties."18 4 The
customers' skepticism regarding arbitrators' open-mindedness and impartiality
makes it unsurprising that they also doubted the arbitration process's fairness.
41. Instead, he points out that both those who impose mandatory arbitration clauses and
those who resist them consistently behave as though mandatory arbitration is not fair; thus
the process is not fair. Id.
173. See Jill 1. Gross & Barbara Black, Perceptions of Fairness of Securities
Arbitration: An Empirical Study 5 (Univ. of Cincinnati Coll. of Law, Pub. Law & Research
Paper Series, No. 08-01, 2008) [hereinafter Gross & Black, Perceptions of Fairness].
174. See id.
175. See id. at 6.
176. According to its website, FINRA is "the largest independent regulator for all
securities firms doing business in the United States." Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/index.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2009). The
organization was established in July 2007 with the consolidation of the National
Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") and "the member regulation, enforcement and
arbitration functions of the New York Stock Exchange." Id.
177. See Gross & Black, Perceptions of Fairness, supra note 173; Jill 1. Gross &
Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Empirical Study of Investors' Views
of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. Disp. RESOL. 349 [hereinafter Gross &
Black, When Perception Changes Reality].
178. See Gross & Black, When Perception Changes Reality, supra note 177, at
383.
179. Idat 387-89.
180. See idat385.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 378.
183. See id. at 3 90n.119.
184. See id. at 390.
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Participants with recent experience in a civil court case also were asked to
compare the fairness of securities arbitration with the fairness of the court process.
A whopping 75.55% of customers found that arbitration was "very unfair"
(62.96%) or "somewhat unfair" (12.59%) when compared with their court
exeine'85 Floigthis and other empirical research referenced earlier,
FINRA has begun changing the procedures used for selecting securities
arbitrators.18 6
Procedural justice research and theory easily explain the divergence in
perceptions between the securities customers and non-customers/industry
representatives, as well as the skepticism displayed by other critics of mandatory
arbitration in the consumer and employment contexts. Four process characteristics
reliably predict perceptions of fairness: (1) the opportunity for people to tell their
stories ("voice"); (2) demonstrated consideration of these stories by the
decisionmaker ("being heard"); (3) the involvement of a decisionmaker who is
trying to be open-minded and fair; and (4) dignified, respectful treatment.' 8 7
Perhaps because people realize that these procedural characteristics can be
manipulated, they tend to be on high alert for "sham" procedures.' 8 ' The
arbitrations described supra are conducted pursuant to contracts that are written by
the repeat players, with arbitration clauses inserted by the repeat players, with
arbitrators coming from the repeat players' industry or trade associations or from
ADR firms that must solicit the repeat players' business. The one-sided nature of
these circumstances is likely to raise doubts regarding the likelihood of real
consideration from arbitrators who are open-minded and fair.
Procedural justice matters because if people perceive a dispute resolution
or decision-making process as procedurally fair, they also are more likely to
perceive the outcome as substantively fair.' 89 Perceptions of procedural justice also
strongly influence compliance and perceptions of the legitimacy of the institution
that provides or sponsors the process.' 90 Why do people care so much about
procedural justice? First, people want to be reassured that the decisionmaker had
access to and considered the information needed to make a good, fair decision. If
the decisionmaker had and considered the information, then the outcome is more
deserving of trust and respect. Second, procedures themselves communicate
whether the people using the procedures are deserving of respect. If the neutral in a
185. See id.
186. See New Securities ADR Pilot Launches, Allowing Industry Arbitrator
Removal, 26 ALTERNATIVES To HIGH COST LITIG. 191, 191 (noting FINRA's adoption of a
pilot program that allows investors to elect arbitrator panel consisting entirely of public
arbitrators, thus excluding any industry arbitrator).
187. See Nancy A. Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S
FIELDBOOK 165, 169 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006)
[hereinafter Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness]; Nancy A. Welsh, Remembering the Role of
Justice in Resolution: Insights from Procedural and Social Justice Theories, 54 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 49, 52 (2004); Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation.
What's Justice Got To Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 820-21 (2001).
188. See Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness, supra note 187, at 170.
189. See id.
190. See id.
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dispute resolution process listens to the disputants before him or her and
consistently demonstrates both respect and a sincere attempt to be open-minded,
these behaviors signal to the disputants that they are valued members of the group,
regardless of whether that group is a nation, a local community, or a workplace.'91
Refutsal to listen or closed-mindedness signals a lack of respect.
More recent research has revealed that people who find themselves in
situations that accentuate hierarchy and unequal status-situations that then trigger
strong suspicions that scarce resources will be allocated on the basis of
identity-based status rather than situation -specific merit 192 -aeeven more likely
to notice if they are treated in a procedurally just manner.19 3 Again, the one-sided
nature of many of the structural characteristics of consumer, employment, and
securities arbitration strongly suggests the presence of hierarchy and the potential
for inequality-i.e., that nothing should be taken for granted when it comes to the
fairness of the dispute resolution procedure or its result.
This cursory description of procedural justice research and theory, along
with the data that have emerged from consumer, employment, and securities
arbitration, reveal why consumer and employee advocates, along with academics
and some ADR advocates, have raised concerns about the existence and
consequences of structural bias among embedded neutrals. However, it has been
relatively easy for courts to brush aside these objections as the overblown fantasies
of people who like to complain or the frivolous objections of those who are
attempting to avoid an inevitable loss on the merits.' 94
191. See id. at 170-7 1.
192. Though I amn clearly privileging one of these bases for the allocation of
resources, I recognize that both can be viewed as grounded in equity. See Welsh,
Perceptions of Fairness, supra note 187, at 166.
193. See id. at 170; Jody Clay-Warner, Perceiving Procedural Injustice: The
Effects of Group Membership and Status, 64 Soc. PSvCHOL. Q 224 (2001); Kristina A.
Diekmann et al., Does Fairness Matter More to Some Than to Others? The Moderating
Role of Workplace Status on the Relationship Between Procedural Fairness Perceptions
and Job Satisfaction, 20 Soc. JUST. RES. 161, 163 (2007); Jan-Willem Van Prooijen et al.,
Procedural Justice and Intragroup Status: Knowing Where We Stand in a Group Enhances
Reactions to Procedures, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYcHOL. 664 (2005).
194. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
634 (1985) (declining "to indulge the presumption that the parties and arbitral body
conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain competent, conscientious, and
impartial arbitrators"); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Jabush, 89 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1996)
(affinming lower court's refusal to enforce arbitration provision based on repeat-player
effect, finding that plaintiff had failed to show any facts that AAA or its arbitrators were
biased); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975 (2d Cir. 1996) (same); Doctor's
Assocs., Inc. v. Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 1998) (reaching same); see also Miller v.
Equifirst Corp., No. 2:00-0335, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63816 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 5, 2006).
The Plaintiff argued that the fee-per-case system used by NAF creates incentive for NAF
arbitrators to rule in favor of lenders to gamner repeat business. Id. The court also pointed to
NMF solicitation materials flaunting close ties to financial services industry and lawyers, as
well as amicus briefs filed by NAF to support lenders' arguments. Id. The court, in denying
the plaintiffs argument, stated that the NAM procedures included adequate protections for
those who were not repeat players including "prior to the selection of the arbitrator, the
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names and qualifications of potential arbitrators are provided to the party . . . [J] the
arbitrator is required to be 'neutral and independent' . . . [, and] in the arbitrator selection
process each party has one peremptory challenge and unlimited challenges for cause." Id.
The court also pointed to a number of other decisions which have similarly found that the
NAF is not biased in favor of repeat players including Bank One, N.A. v. Coates, 125 F.
Supp. 2d 819 (S.D. Miss. 2001); Marsh v. First USA Bank, N.A., 103 F. Supp. 2d 909 (N.D.
Tex. 2000); Hutcherson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 793 N.E.2d 886, 898 (111. 2003). 1d; see
also MLDX Invs., Inc. v. Parse, No. 2:06-CV-00 121 PGC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36613, at
*22 (D. Utah June 1, 2006) (finding that "there has been no showing that such
[NASD/NYSE] arbitration panels disproportionately favor brokers"). California courts
repeatedly cite Mercurio for the proposition that the repeat-player effect is not enough by
itself to find an arbitration agreement unconscionable. See Imagistics Int'l, Inc. v. Dep't of
General Servs., 150 Cal. App. 4th 581 (2007) (finding no showing of the oppressive
procedural unconscionability present in Mercurio); Hogan v. Nordstrom, Inc., No.
Al113160, 2007 Cal. App. LEXIS 4651 (June 11, 2007) (finding no evidence to refute
Nordstrom's contention that the AAA has thousands of arbitrators that can be called to
arbitrate any given dispute); Husky v. Hollywood Entm't Corp., No. H029401, 2006 Cal.
App. LEXIS 5752 (June 30, 2006) (noting that concerns in Mercuro not present); Meoli v.
AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., No. A106061, 2005 Cal. App. LEXIS 4366 (May 18, 2005);
Belinsky v. BPM Goldman Fin. Design, LLC, No. Al104645, 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 10595
(Nov. 18, 2004) (finding no factual showing for the court to find a "repeat player effect");
McManus v. CIBC World Markets Corp., 109 Cal. App. 4th 76 (2003) (finding no evidence
that the NASD/NYSE rules regarding disclosure garner a "repeat player effect"). Under
New York law, in a former partner's action to recover retirement benefits from the
partnership, the trial court correctly concluded that it did not have sufficient information to
conclude that an arbitration panel that included two members of the board of directors and
three other partners would be biased. BDO Seidman, LLP v. Bee, 970 So. 2d 869, 877 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2007). With respect to the provision of arbitrators, under New York law,
"parties may not complain merely because the arbitrators named were known to be chosen
with a view to a particular relationship to their nominator or to the subject-matter of the
controversy." Astoria Med. Group v. Health Ins. Plan, 182 N.E.2d 85, 89 (N.Y. 1962). In
Westingho use Electric Corp. v. NY City Transit Authority, the court noted:
[I]t has long been the policy of New York courts to interfere as little as
possible with the freedom of consenting parties, '[tjherefore, strange as it
may seem . .. a fully known relationship between an arbitrator and a
party, including one as close as employer and employee ... will not in
and of itself disqualif~y the designee.'
623 N.E.2d 531, 534 (N.Y. 1993). The court found the designation of an employee of one of
the parties as the arbitrator of disputes not to be substantively unconscionable. Id. Relying
on Westinghouse, the court in Greenwald v. Weisbaum, 785 N.Y.S.2d 664 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2004), upheld the validity and enforceability of the BDO arbitration provision. The court
noted:
The arbitration provision safeguards the arbitration proceeding by
requiring the panel to consist primarily of non-Board Members and that
no member can be from the same office as the complaining partner, nor
be otherwise involved in the controversy or dispute. Additionally, since
every partner of BDO may be compelled in the future to arbitrate a
dispute before such a panel, this dramatically illustrates that there is
certainly a reasonable expectation that the arbitration will not be unfair.
Id at 670. The Connecticut Supreme Court came to the same conclusion in Hottle v. BDO
Seidman, LLP, 846 A.2d 862 (Conn. 2004), applying New York law. Both cases
distinguished an earlier case, Cross & Brown Co. v. Nelson, 167 N.Y.S.2d 573 (N.Y. App.
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The objections became more difficult to brush aside, however, after
Minnesota Attorney General Lori Swanson filed a state court complaint 9" in 2009
against the National Arbitration Forum (NAF). An analysis of that case, as
described in the Minnesota complaint,19 6 will provide the opportunity to test the
application of the rule emerging from Caperton to a situation involving an
embedded neutral.
111. THE SPECIAL CASE OF THE NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM 97
NAF, a for-profit corporation, was founded in Minnesota in 1986.'9' NAF
received very substantial business from credit-card companies, as well as mortgage
lenders, retailers that make loans to purchasers of their products, debt buyers, and
cell phone companies. 99 NAF solicited this business and-according to
allegations contained in the Minnesota complaint-made some of the following
claims to persuade repeat players to insert mandatory arbitration clauses in their
boilerplate agreements:
[Benefits of arbitration include a] marked increase in recovery rates
over existing collection efforts. (PowerPoint presentation to
bank.) 200
The customer does not know what to expect from Arbitration and is
more willing to pay.
They [customers] ask you to explain what Arbitration is then
basically hand you the money.
Div. 1957), on which Bee relies; see also Roger J. Perlstadt, Timing of Institutional Bias
Challenges to Arbitration, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1983 (2002) (urging that institutional bias
objections should be allowed to be raised early).
195. See Complaint, State v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum (D. Minn. filed July 14,
2009).
196. This Article will use allegations made against NAF and statements made in
deposition testimony as if they are true. This Article is not asserting the truth of such
allegations or statements. Instead, the allegations and statements are being used to consider
the potential application of Caperton to embedded neutrals. In a sense, the approach taken
by this Article is consistent with the Supreme Court instruction to trial courts in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937
(2009). When confronted with motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, judges must
assume that the allegations are true and view them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. They must then determine whether the allegations present a plausible cause of
action-not just a conceivable claim, but a plausible claim. This Article takes the same
approach-accepting the Minnesota complaint's allegations as true and then determining
whether they present a plausible claim under the 14th Amendment's Due Process Clause, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court most recently in Caperton.
197. Or egregious tip of the iceberg? My thanks to Christopher Honeyman for
suggesting this different perspective in his comments to a different article involving
similarly creative parties.
198. Mollenkamp et al., supra note 46, at A20.
199. Complaint at 5, State v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum (D. Minn. filed July 14,
2009).
200. Id. T95.
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You have all the leverage and the customer really has little choice
but to take care of this account. 201
It is unclear when these representations allegedly were made and by whom.
Nonetheless, by 2006, NMF had become this country's largest provider of
consumer debt arbitration services, handling 214,000 claims in that year alone.20
Accretive LLC, a private equity firm, approached NMF in 2006 and
apparently expressed its interest in some form of partnering. 0 Accretive officials
communicated to NAF that they saw the ADR 2organization as having the
"potential to blossom into a billion-dollar business." 04 Further, they perceived that
"[b]y expanding beyond credit-card disputes to resolving disagreements between
hospitals and patients, NMF had the potential to be 'the center of a broad
arbitration ecosystem . ...
According to the Minnesota complaint, NAF was interested, but some of
its officials worried about the repercussions if its relationship with Accretive
became public. By e-mail (attached to the complaint), Mike Kelly, NAF's chief
operating officer, recommended "that any Accretive stake in NMF be acquired
through 'a new fund as the investment vehicle' [and that] there should be 'no
public information connecting Accretive with the fund that ultimately acquires and
holds the minority interest' in NM. 0 Accretive and NMF signed a letter of
intent in 2007.20 In response to Kelly's concerns, Accretive formed several
wholly-owned entities called Agora which then paid $42 million for a 40%
ownership stake in a new company, Forthright. 0  NAF took a 58.3% stake in the
company.20 NAF and Agora also entered into an agreement giving Agora the right
201. Id. 196.
202. Id.
203. It is unclear who initiated this contact. in a November 20, 2008 e-mail from
Mike Kelly of NAF to Madhu Tadikonda of Accretive, Kelly indicates that Accretive will
need to pay "[a] non-refuindable fee to take us off the market during negotiations." E-mail
from Michael Kelly, CEO, Nat'l Arbitration Forum, to Madhu Tadikonda, Gen. Partner,
Accretive Tech. Partners, LLC (Nov. 20, 2008) (on file with author). This suggests that
NAY had positioned itself as a target for acquisition or merger.
204. Mollenkamp et al., supra note 46, at A20.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Complaint at 18, State v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum (D. Minn. filed July 14,
2009).
208. Id
209. See id at 15, State v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum (D. Minn. filed July 14, 2009).
The remaining 1.7% are allegedly in endowments of major academic institutions. Id. at 32
(reporting that an NAF spokesperson said: "Following its spin-out from the FORUM,
interested investors acquired a noncontrolling, passive, minority position in Forthright.
These several investors are primarily high net-worth individuals and endowments of major
academic institutions.") I thank my colleague Lance Cole for pointing out that even though
Agora appeared to play an influential role, it demanded only a minority share of Forthright
and thus was not in legal control of the company.
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to appoint two of the members of Forthright's five- erson board .2 10 NAF's in-
house counsel became in-house counsel for Forthright.
Pursuant to a Services Agreement required by Accretive's principals,
Forthright then took over most of the tasks involved in administering arbitrations
and mediations. 1 One task that clearly remained with NMF was the retention of
the neutrals.213 It is less clear whether NAF or Forthright was responsible for
paying the neutrals 2t4 and administering the process of selecting neutrals for cases.
In return for these administrative services, NAM paid Forthright a "monthly seven-
figure fee and a 'success fee' based on a formula related to the amount of revenue
received by NAF",2 '5 According to the complaint, "95 percent of [NAF's]
revenue" went to Forthright "after direct-arbitrator (mediator) costs."2 16 Agora,
Accretive, and its principals appear to have profited directly from the arbitrations
conducted by NMF based on revenues generated by the Services Agreement and its
ownership of Forthright. Forthright thus served as a vehicle for Accretive's
investment in NMF while pernitting Accretive to avoid direct involvement in the
provision of arbitration services.
NAF's concern about concealing Accretive's investment likely was
motivated by Accretive's simultaneous decision to invest in another company
engaged in consumer debt collection. Specifically, Accretive entered into a
financial relationship with employees of Mann Bracken, a large debt-collection
law firm. 2 17 This firm represented credit-card companies in a large percentage of
NAF's arbitrations involving collection actions against consumers. 28Accretive
joined with members of the Mann Bracken firm to create Axiant LLC.2 1 Mann
Bracken contributed most of its assets and liabilities associated with telephone
collections service operations, "including non-attomey personnel," to Axiant. 2 20
Accretive owned 68.7% of Axiant, while the Mann Bracken firm members owned
31. 3%.221
In a very real sense, with these two investments, Accretive had created a
vertically integrated dispute resolution business .2 2 2 Credit-card companies brought
210. Id. at 22.
211. Id. at 17.
212. Id. at 14.
213. Id. at 16.
214. See id. at 15; see also Mollenkamp et al., supra note 46, at A20.
215. Complaint at 16, State v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum (D. Minn. filed July 14,
2009).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 17.
218. Id. atl10.
219. Id. at 2.
220. Id. at 25.
221 Id. at 11, 17, 24-25, 27-28.
222 See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, 3 ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PIN'CIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 194-95 (1978) (defining
vertical integration as the "inclusion within a single firm of two or more stages in the
production and distribution of an end-product"); JAMES WALKER & DOUGLAS FERGUSON,
THE BROADCAST TELEVISION INDUSTRY 214 (1998) (defining vertical integration as "[aln
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their collection matters to Mann Bracken, which attempted debt collection. If that
did not work, Mann Bracken lawyers referred the cases to NAF for arbitration.
According to the Minnesota complaint, in some instances, NAF even helped to
223draft claims against consumers. NAF/Forthright referred the cases to NAF's
arbitrators, who then conducted arbitration proceedings. NAF's arbitrators found
for the credit-card companies nearly 95% of the time. The credit-card companies
then turned to the courts, which transformed the arbitral awards into judgments.
Axiant then took over and proceeded to collect on these judgments. Arbitration
had become just another part of the debt collection business.
Importantly, NAF created a "Chinese wall" (now known as a "screen"224)
to protect its arbitration services from contact with the operations conducted by
Forthright/Mann Bracken.22 NAF's chief operating officer also established
separate office spaces-though perhaps in the same building-for these
operations, with secure key-card access and separate information-technology
infrastructures. 2 He apparently concluded that these actions sufficiently removed
any potential conflicts of interest and permitted the relationship with Accretive to
proceed.
In July 2009, the Minnesota Attorney General brought her action against
NAF, relying on Minnesota statutes.227 NAF quickly agreed to end its consumer
debt arbitration business. 2 2 8 Based on the volume, flow, and timing of money
detailed above, could the rule emerging from Caperton provide a constitutional
basis for attacking NAF 's arbitrators as insufficiently impartial-or as creating too
strong a probability of bias? Perhaps more usefully, could the reasoning in
Caperton be used to erect more effective protections of both the reality and the
appearance of impartiality in the procedures involving embedded neutrals?
industry in which the owners of the means of production also own the means of
distribution"); Note, Challenging Concentration of Control in the American Meat Industry,
117 HARV. L. REV. 2643, 2644 n.10 (2004) (citing HENRY A. WALLACE CTR. FOR AGRIC. &
ENVTL. POL'Y AT W1NROCK INT'L, MAKING CHANGES: TURNING LOCAL VISIONS INTO
NATIONAL SOLUTIONS: AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY
RECOMMENDAIONS FROM IHE ACRICLILTURE POLICY PROJECT 11 (2001) (defining vertical
integration in agriculture as "the coordination or ownership of various levels of production,
processing, and distribution of farm products under one decisionmaking unit").
223. Complaint at 3, State v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum (D. Minn. filed July 14,
2009).
224. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(k) (2006) (describing effective
screening mechanisms); Id. R. 1.10(a)(2)(i) (requiring firm's timely screening of lawyer
who is disqualified from representing a client due to conflict of interest, as well as no
apportionment of fee received from such client).
225. Complaint at Exhibit 2, State v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum (D. Minn. filed July
14, 2009).
226. See Mollenkamp et al., supra note 46, at A20.
227. Complaint at 3, State v. Nai'l Arbitration Forum (D. Minn. filed July 14,
2009).
228. Mollenkamp et al., supra note 46, at A20.
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A. Caperton 's Potential Application to NAF
1. A Necessary Tangent-The Necessity of State Action
It is essential to begin this discussion by noting that unlike the situation in
Caperton, which involved a West Virginia judge, it is not certain that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would apply to actions taken by a
for-profit corporation such as NAF or by any of its individual, private arbitrators.
The Due Process Clause provides: "nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." 229 The elements of a due process
claim thus include (1) deprivation, (2) by a state actor, (3) of the life, liberty or
property, (4) of a person, (5) without due process of law. Caperton, and the cases
upon which it relies, establish that the last requirement can be met when a court
concludes that the amount and timing of financial contributions made to help
ensure the installation of a judge will, as an objective matter, present too great a
risk of tempting the average man not to hold the balance "nice, clear and true." 230
The difficulty here is that the Due Process Clause-like other
requirements of the Constitution-generally does not apply to private parties. In
other words, private action generally does not need to meet the requirements of
due process .23 1 NAF is a private party, providing individual arbitrators who
conduct arbitrations in private contract disputes and issue arbitral awards to
individual consumers and for-profit corporations. On the face of these events, there
is no state action or state actor involved.
Professors Jean Stemlight, Richard Reuben, and others have argued,
however, that consistent judicial enforcement-and even encouragement-of
mandatory arbitration clauses, along with consistent judicial enforcement of
arbitral awards, implicate the public function and entanglement exceptions to the
state action doctrine. 232 Under the circumstances that characterize today's
229. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1I
230. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2255 (2009) (quoting
Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972))
231. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883).
232. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Fairness in Securities Arbitration: A Constitutional
Mandate?, 26 PACE L. REV. 73, 76 (2005) [hereinafter Cole, Fairness in Securities
Arbitration] (arguing that "the SEC's involvement in the SRO arbitration process
transforms the private SROs that directly administer the arbitration process into state actors
for purposes of arbitration"); Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action
Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REv. 577, 615-19 (1997); Richard C.
Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REv. 949, 994-1009 (2000) (explaining public function
and entanglement exceptions, applying them to "private" ADR procedures and urging that
state action should be found in the event of "statutory delegation of a traditionally exclusive
public function or the partnership of public and private actors in facilitating unconstitutional
conduct") [hereinafter Reuben, Constitutional Gravity]; Jean R. Stemlight, Rethinking the
Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh
Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TuL. L.
REV. 1, 40-47 (1997) (arguing that state action exists at least to the extent legislatures and
courts are relying on a preference for arbitration over litigation to interpret the validity and
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enforcement of arbitration clauses and awards, the line between the public justice
system and private dispute resolution is difficult to discern. 3 As Professor Sarah
Cole recently pointed out, it is even more difficult to establish a public-private
divide when a public regulatory body plays a significant role in the operations of
an industry and its resolution of disputes. 2 3 4 Rather than repeating the arguments
made by these colleagues and others on these points, this Article will simply
incorporate them by reference, just for the purpose of creating the possibility that
the Due Process Clause could be applied directly to NAF and its arbitrators .23" For
scope of arbitration agreements). But see In re National Arbitration Forum Trade Practices
Litigation, No. Civ. 09-1939, 2010 WL 605710 (D. Minn. Feb. 22, 2010) (granting
defendants' 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss due process claim, based on finding that "NAF is a
private entity" and though "[ult may have been engaged in quasi-judicial functions. ... that
does not mean it is a state actor"); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Arbitration and State Action, 2005
BYU L. REV. 1 (arguing against state action). Professor Larry Backer has recently linked
sovereign immunity and state action:
Thus, sovereign immunity is criticized because it preserves a space in
law where the apparatus of state is not treated like other objects of law
(the common citizen or legal subject), and state action is criticized for
insulating individuals and other non-state entities from obligations
otherwise imposed on the state. There is a strong principle of levelling,
of horizontal equity, inherent in these criticisms. The criticisms also
mark a strong mutation of rule of law notions to one that suggests a
substantive governance component of equal treatment and equal
obligation among public and private entities. Perhaps also, the criticisms
suggest the ways in which the state has ceased to be "special" and
different. This last point is especially powerful in the context of the
recent push to privatize traditional governmental functions either by
delegation (through contract) or by leaving areas of behavior regulation
to the "market."
Larry Backer, On State Action and Sovereign Immunity, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY, June
11, 2007, http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2007/06/on-state-action-and-sovereign-
iminunity.html.
233. Nancy A. Welsh, The Place of Court-Connected Mediation in a Democratic
Justice System, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 117 (2004). Richard Reuben urges that
[A] unitary theory of public civil dispute resolution joins trial and some
of what is now called private ADR into a single system of interrelated
dispute resolution processes, with the intensity of constitutional force
decreasing the further removed the dispute resolution process becomes
from the purview of the government. This constitutional force, or
gravity, is determined by reference to the nature of the ADR process, the
nature of the constitutional values at risk in the process, and the
coerciveness of the role of the state in that process.
Reuben. Constitutional Gravity, supra note 232, at 1047. There also seems to be increasing
fuzziness in the relationship between our "justice" system (formerly understood as public
and dominated by the courts) and "risk management" system (formerly understood as
private and dominated by insurers). See Nancy A. Welsh, I Could Have Been a Contender:-
The Potential Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Pre-Litigation Negotiation and Other Forms
of Early, Consensual Dispute Resolution, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. (forthcoming 20 10).
234. See Cole, Fairness in Securities Arbitration, supra note 232, at 83-97.
235. 1 will save for another day an exploration of case law interpreting federal
statutes, court rules, or judicial canons of ethics that might also reveal an approach to
432
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the limited purposes of this Article,23 then, we may either assume that the Due
Process Clause could be found to apply directly to NAF and its operations through
relevant exceptions to the state action doctrine, or alternatively-and much less
provocatively-we may adopt the approach used by the Su reme Court in
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.2 3V There, Justice
Black observed that he could "see no basis" for refusing to find in "the broad
statutory language [of the Federal Arbitration Act or FAA] that governs arbitration
proceedings" the "constitutional principle" of impartiality applicable to courts.23
Thus, even if the Due Process Clause does not apply directly, we may import its
jurisprudence into the FAA.
With this assumption in place, we are now ready to determine whether
NAF's corporate and financial structures resulted in a situation in which an
average NAF arbitrator would be unconstitutionally tempted "not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true." 3
2. Finding a Temptation That Is Unconstitutionally Strong
We will continue to assume, as we have thus far and for the limited
purpose of testing the potential application of Caperton to embedded neutrals, that
the allegations contained in the Minnesota Attorney General's complaint are true.
If we accept these allegations as true, it is clear that very substantial money flowed
into NAF from Accretive, by way of Agora, and that Accretive personnel began to
play a significant role in NAF's governance, administration, business
development, marketing, and perhaps even its self-identity. It is also clear that
Agora personnel were given access to highly confidential information about
safeguarding due process that is similar to the one taken by the majority in Caperton.
236. And recognizing that others may quite legitimately disagree with a relatively
freewheeling approach to collapsing the public-private divide. See generally Richard
Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 232; Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability:
Privatization, Public-ization, and Public Values, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y I11
(2005).
237. 393 U.S. 145 (1968). But see Linas Ledebur, Plurality Rule: Concurring
Opinions and a Divided Supreme Court, 113 PENN ST. L. REv. 899, 908 (2009) (noting the
Justice White's concurring opinion is cited much more frequently than Justice Black's even
though Justice White had also joined Justice Black's opinion).
238. Commonwealth Coatings Corp., 393 U.S. at 148. Justice Black added:
It is true that arbitrators cannot sever all their ties with the business
world, since they are not expected to get all their income from their work
deciding cases, but we should, if anything, be even more scrupulous to
safeguard the impartiality of arbitrators than judges, since the former
have completely free rein to decide the law as well as the facts and are
not subject to appellate review.
Id at 148-49; see also Boumnediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2268 (2008) ("The idea that
the necessary scope of habeas review in part depends upon the rigor of any earlier
proceedings accords with our test for procedural adequacy in the due process context."). But
see Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 653-54 (1990) (noting that
the Due Process Clause had not been specifically invoked and that the statute at issue did
not specifically require the procedural protections being demanded by LTV).
239. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2255 (2009).
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NAF's arbitration business, including data regarding "claim volume and revenue
trends, .. finances, personnel, judgment trends, [and] arbitrator credentials. 4
Finally, if we accept the complaint's allegations as true, it seems reasonable to
assume that Accretive's profits were affected by the success of Axiant, its joint
venture with the law firm of Mann Bracken-and that Axiant's success in
performing its debt collection function depended upon Mann Bracken's success in
acquiring arbitral awards. 24 '1 Though the Minnesota complaint describes a complex
web of corporate structures and financing, it is clear that Accretive was affiliated
financially and in terms of governance with NAF, and that Accretive also had a
direct financial interest in ensuring that the arbitrations conducted by NAF assisted
debt collection. The relevant question, though, is not whether Accretive would
have been able to hold the balance nice, clear and true. Our focus is on the ability
of the individual NAP arbitrator to maintain that balance.
It seems quite likely, meanwhile, that Accretive and Agora influenced
NAF. As noted above, Agora was able to appoint two of the five directors on
Forthright's board, and Forthright became the entity that collected the income,
paid the expenses, and distributed 58.7% of the net profits to NAF's principals. In
2006, Mann Bracken, whose employees were partial owners of Axiant (along with
Accretive), was responsible for over 50% of the consumer debt collection
arbitration claims that resulted in filings, income, and net profits for NAF's
principals. 4 In addition, Accretive/Agora. principals fed NAF's dreams and
ambitions. Accretive/Agora "promised to 'launch' the Forum into new lines of
business" ;2 4 3 described NAF as "sit[ting] at the center of a broad arbitration
ecosystem" ;244 helped NAF principals imagine "[a]rbitration expand~ing] to
become a comprehensive, alternative legal system" ;2 4 5 discussed at a Forthright
board meeting "methods to increase the number of large batch claims being
processed by arbitrators, and changes in the process that would provide filers
access to working capital"; 26assisted NAF in developing bids for new business;24
and invested $42 million in NAF.24 Even though ADR has become a big business,
$42 million is still a lot of money. It seems quite likely that with Accretive's
encouragement, NAF began (or continued) to evolve from a company that
modeled itself after the courts-an image that remained dominant in the
representations on the company's website 2 4 9 -to one that had re-imagined itself as
a successfuil and efficient business focused on a profitable, high-volume segment
240. Complaint at 18-19, State v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum (D. Minn. filed July
14, 2009).
241. Id. at 29- 31.
242. Id. at 29.
243. Id. at 13.
244. Id.
245. Id Exhibit 1 ("NAP-Strategic Vision").
246. Id. at 23.
247. Id. at 24.
248 Id. at 2.
249. Id at 7-9.
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of the dispute resolution market. That change in self-image likely resulted in a
change in values and normative anchors.25
But does Accretive's investment of the "extraordinary" sum of more than
$42 million in NAF and its influence on the governance and direction of the
organization, occurring at about the same time that Accretive invested heavily in
the debt-collection industry, meet the objective standard of creating a "probability
of actual bias on the part of' NAF that "is too high to be constitutionally
tolerable? 2 5 1 This question is also not the relevant question to be answered, at
least not at this point in the Article. The focus in Caperton was not on the West
Virginia court as a whole and whether it was likely to be biased as a result of the
support it received from a particular individual or set of interests.2 5 Instead, the
focus in Caperton was on the strength of such influence upon an individual
justice.5 Was his refusal to recuse himself constitutionally suspect because of the
source and timing of the campaign contributions that helped him to gain something
he coveted-a seat on the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals?
Thus, the Caperton analysis requires us to examine the individual
arbitrator and assess the probability that NAF's reliance on the repeat business of
credit-card companies and its financial connection to the debt collection industry-
through Accretive and its various investment vehicles-would have affected the
arbitrator's ability to hold the balance nice, clear and true. But Caperton also
poses a limitation in making this inquiry: it establishes an objective, not a
subjective, standard for the violation of due process. We are not examining the
character of any particular NAF arbitrator or even the character of all of those on
NAF's panel, just as Caperton did not examine the character of Justice Benjamin
250. See Jill M. Purdy & Barbara Gray, Conflicting Logics, Mechanisms of
Diffusion, and Multilevel Dynamics in Emerging Institutional Fields, 52 ACAD. MGMT. J.
355 (2009) (describing stages of evolution of emerging fields and diffuse actors' selective
use and exploitation of ideas that serve their own interests).
251. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009).
252. This is an important question, however, and one that deserves (and will
receive) closer study.
253. This focus is consistent with the general notion that the "culture" of the U.S.
tends to be individualistic rather than collectivist. See JEAN M. BRETr, NEGOTIATING
GLOBALLY: How To NEGOTIATE DEALS, RESOLVE DISPUTES, AND MAKE DECISIONS ACROSS
CULTURAL BOUNDARIES 32-34 (2007); Kwok Leung & Michael W. Morris, Justice Through
the Lens of Culture and Ethnicity, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAw 348 (Joseph
Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001) ("[I]ndividualism refers to a tendency to put a
stronger emphasis on one's personal interest and goals, whereas collectivism refers to a
stronger emphasis on the interests and goals of one's in-group members."); Geert Hofstede,
The Cultural Relativity of Organizational Practices and Theories, J. INT'L Bus. STUD., Fall
1983, at 75 (finding the U.S. in an extremely high position on the individualism scale).
There are very significant variations within American society, however, depending upon the
in-groups and subcultures with which individual Americans identify. See Hazel Rose
Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, Culture and the SeW(. Implications for C'ognition, Emotion,
and Moti vation, 98 PSYCHOL. REv. 224, 229 (199 1) ("[Elven in American culture, there is a
strong theme of interdependence that is reflected in the values and activities of many of its
subcultures."); Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness, supra note 187, at 167 (observing that
collectivists' negotiation choices will depend upon characteristics of the particular contexts
in which they are making these choices).
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or the character of any other particular justice on the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals.
Therefore, we must consider whether NAF's reliance on the repeat
business of credit-card companies and Accretive's $42 million investment and
roles in NAF's operations was likely to affect the average man's ability to hold the
balance nice, clear and true. That brings us to several questions. Did NAF
arbitrators rely on the organization for a substantial share of their income? Is there
evidence that NAF arbitrators were aware or had reason to be aware of the
company's solicitations of credit-card companies and other repeat players? Is there
evidence that NAF arbitrators were aware or had reason to be aware of
Accretive/Agora's role and influence? What were the NAF 'judgment trends" that
Accretive/Agora examined as part of its due diligence when deciding whether to
invest in NAF? Did NAF arbitrators know that NAF was tracking their judgment
trends? Why did NAF gather information about judgment trends? Perhaps most
importantly, did NAF do anything differently in referring cases to arbitrators as a
result of its assessment of those judgment trends? Finally, who managed the
administrative task of determining which arbitrators would receive referrals-and
thus receive the resulting fees?
No information from the Minnesota complaint answers any of these
questions. Public Citizen's report, however, has information regarding the volume
of cases handled by some NAF arbitrators. 2 5 4 According to that report, during the
approximate four-year period between January 1, 2003, and March 31, 2007,
NAF's ten busiest arbitrators heard between 699 and 1332 credit-card cases.25
They may also have heard other types of cases, but that information was
unavailable. This volume of cases suggests the possibility of some reliance on
income from NAF and, thus, the potential for a reduced ability to maintain
independence and impartiality. Some people now make a very good living serving
primarily as neutrals. If NAF had required exclusivity or a non-compete agreement
from its neutrals, both common sense and relevant socio-psychological research
regarding the influence of group membership upon individual human beings256
would suggest an increased likelihood that an average person serving as an NAF
arbitrator could find his or her judgment affected by NAF's business needs and
aspirations. It is not clear, however, that the money involved here would affect an
average man's or woman's judgment enough to be viewed by the current Supreme
Court as "constitutionally [in] tolerable."
Public Citizen's allegations regarding NAF arbitrators' knowledge of
NAF's solicitation of business from credit-card companies and NAF's reliance on
254. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 142, at 16.
255. Id. But see E-mail from Mark Fellows, Legal Counsel, Forthright, to Nancy
Welsh, Professor, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law (April 21, 20 10) (on file
with author) (noting that "[alverage FORUM arbitrator compensation in 2008 equaled less
than 5% of the national average annual salary of an attorney with 15 years of practice
experience").
256. See Ronald J. Fisher, Intergroup Conflict, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 166, 17 1-72 (Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman eds., 2000) (describing
social identity and its effects). E-mail from Mark Fellows, supra note 255 (explaining that
the FORUM did not impose exclusivity requirements).
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such referrals for a significant share of its business were widely publicized within
the dispute resolution community and, more broadly, in the business community. It
thus seems likely that NMF arbitrators would have known about such concerns.2
In contrast, there is no evidence that NAF's arbitrators were aware or had reason to
be aware of Accretive/Agora's extraordinary investment in NAF or of its role in
NAF's operations. Indeed, given the care and cleverness with which NAF,
Accretive, and Mann Bracken disguised their corporate and financial relationship,
there is every reason to presume that NAF arbitrators did not know about this.
Again, this suggests that the money involved and, more importantly, its "temporal
relationship" with an average person serving as an NMF arbitrator was not enough
to represent a sufficiently "serious, objective risk of actual bias" to violate due
process.25
Finally, Public Citizen reported the "noisy withdrawal 2 5 9 of Harvard
Law School Professor Elizabeth Bartholet from the organization, along with her
concern about NAF's "apparent systematic bias in favor of the financial services
industry."2 6 0 This story was publicized widely within the dispute resolution
community. Bartholet's withdrawal provides additional guidance on whether the
flow of money into NMF-from Accretive/Agora, Mann Bracken and the credit-
card companies-and this money's temporal relationship with any particular NAF
arbitrators or arbitrations should lead to a finding of an unconstitutionally strong
risk of biased decision-making by an arbitrator.
Professor Bartholet is a longtime arbitrator. She has served on labor and
commercial panels for the AAA, MREP, JAMS-Endispute, the Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination, and, beginning in early 2003, for NM. In
257. See Robert Berner & Brian Grow, Banks v. Consumers (Guess Who Wins),
Bus.WK., June 16, 2008, at 72; Nathan Koppel, Arbitration Firm Faces Questions Over
Neutrality, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2008, at A3; Roger S. Haydock, Letter to the Editor,
Arbitration Forum Is Fair and Balanced, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2008, at ALO (Haydock is the
managing director of NAF); Serres, supra note 20, at IlD.
258. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2264-65 (2009).
259. A lawyer's "noisy withdrawal" from the representation of a client has long
been understood as ethical, under certain conditions. Its use became much more problematic
when the SEC incorporated the concept into the Sarbanes-Oxley bill. See Lawyer Conduct
and Corporate Misconduct, 117 HARv. L. Rev. 2227, 2244 n.l 114 (2004) (citing George C.
Hamrs, Taking the Entity Theory Seriously: Lawyer Liability for Failure to Prevent Harm to
Organizational Clients Through Disclosure of Constituent Wrongdoing, 11I GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 597, 607 (1998) ("Rule 1. 16, together with other provisions of the Model Rules and
comments to the Rules, has been interpreted to allow such 'noisy' withdrawal where the
lawyer's work product is being used or will be used to perpetrate a fraud.")); Susan P.
Koniak, When the Hurlyburly s Done: The Bar's Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L.
REv. 1236, 1270 (2003) (arguing that noisy withdrawal is the ABA's "own invention" and
noting that Model Rule 1.6 has always "allowed a withdrawing lawyer to disaffirm any
document produced during the representation"); DongJu Song, Note, The Laws of Securities
Lawyering After Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 DUKE L.J. 257, 260, 286, 2 78-79 (2003) (noting that
"comment 14 to [Model Rule 1.6] explicitly contemplates and permits giving notice of a
withdrawal and disaffirmance of opinions, documents, and affirmations").
260. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 142, at 3 1.
261. Transcript of Deposition of Elizabeth Bartholet at 8-9, Carr v. Gateway, No.
03-L-1271 (3d Cir. Ct. 1ll. Dec. 12, 2007) [hereinafter Bartholet Deposition].
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eighteen of nineteen credit-card arbitrations she received, she ruled for the credit-
card company, requiring the consumer to pay the money owed. 6 In the nineteenth
case, Professor Bartholet dismissed the credit-card company's claim on the
263merits. None of these arbitrations involved a hearing. Only in the twentieth case
that she arbitrated for NAF did the consumer request a hearing and assert a
counterclaim . 264After the hearing and considering "a fair number of papers" that
the consumer submitted, Professor Bartholet ruled against the credit-card company
on its claim and for the consumer on the counterclaim. 265 On March 5, 2004, she
issued her decision ordering the credit-card company to pay "$48,000 plus some"
to the consumer. 6 Professor Bartholet decided two more cases, to which she had
been assigned long before, neither involved a credit-card company as a party. 2 6 7
And then, in the next eleven cases to which she had been assigned, Professor
Bartholet received notices from NAF that it had either chosen to remove her or the
credit-card company had dismissed its collection action.26 She had never been
removed before, 269 and not all of these cases involved the credit-card company that
had been a party to her previous arbitrations. 20Professor Bartholet was suspicious
that her $48,000 award in favor of the consumer in one case had been disclosed to
other credit-card companies and that these companies were, as a result, choosing to
avoid using her as an arbitrator. 2 7 1 In addition, in at least three of the cases in
which NAF chose to remove Professor Bartholet, it reasoned that she had a
"scheduling conflict." Puzzled because she had never asserted such a conflict,
Professor Bartholet called a case administrator 2 7 2 at NAM "because the letter was
untrue and because [she] suddenly found [her]self disqualified. 7  Professor
Bartholet described the conversation as follows:
Q: What did you and Miss Broberg discuss during your call?
A: I told her about my concern that I felt I was being removed based
on the fact that I had decided a single significant case against credit-
card company X after having decided a whole lot for them which I
knew was somewhere between one and two dozen. I didn't know
the exact number at that time and I told her of my concern that this
letter was untrue and would be misleading to the parties. This was a
letter addressed to the parties and would be misleading to the
parties, particularly the creditor [actually the debtor or consumer,
per a clarification later in the deposition] party who would be misled
as to the reason that I would not be hearing the case.
262. Id. at 21-22.
263. Id. at 22.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 22, 30.
267. Id. at 31.
268. Id. at 34.
269. Id. at 40.
270. Id. at 117.
271. Idati118.
272. Idat 45.
273. Id. at 38.
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Q: Did Miss Broberg give you any reason why this letter had been
sent?
A: Yes, she did.
Q: What did she say?
[Various objections]
A: Say. In response to my statement that was roughly do you think
there could be any reason for them disqualifying me other than the
fact I ruled against them in Case Y. She said no. She basically
agreed that that was the reason and in response to my concern about
this misleading letter about my unavailability having been sent out,
she said that it was a form letter that was simply regularly sent out
in all of the cases and it hadn't been-I mean the implication was,
therefore, it had not been done particularly in this case. It was just a
form letter that was sent out in all the cases. 274
Professor Bartholet subsequently received a call from Colleen Askvig,
who she understood to be NAF's legal counsel, responsible for supervising the
case administrators. 7 Though Ms. Askvig apparently thought that Professor
Bartholet was concerned that parties might be engaging in inappropriate
"arbitrator-shopping," Professor Bartholet' s "fairness" concerns actually revolved
around the danger of systemic, structural bias at NAF:
The fairness concern I expressed was that the repeat player
credit card company was allowed to eliminate an arbitrator that they
found coming out against them and that if that went on a repeated
basis, then you would be left with a panel of arbitrators that would
be systematically biased . . . . With NAF[,] you have a repeat player
which you might have in certain court situations[,] but with NAF
you not only have the repeat player who at least in the cases I got
was, you know, the same repeat player engaged in debt
collection . .. you also have a private system of justice where the
arbitrators are not elected or appointed for terms or for life as
274. Id at 38-41. But see E-mail Attachment from Roger Haydock, Managing
Dir., Nat'l Arbitration Forum, to Jean Stemlight, Professor, UNLV Boyd School of Law,
Debunking Myths about Arbitrator Selection-Responding to Neely and Bartholet (April 2,
2008) (on file with author). The e-mail attachment asserts that erroneous notice documents
were sent "purely as the result of a clerical mistake" and were sent
on the same day by the same case coordinator who was new to the
FORUM. Fortunately, the proper documents notifying the parties that
Bartholet had been removed as arbitrator by the claimant were also
mailed to the appropriate parties. ... Far from illustrating any systematic
manipulation, the Bartholet deposition transcript simply reports that she
was removed as an arbitrator under FORUM Rule 2 1(C) three times on
April 20, 2004-the sort of procedural maneuvering that has long been
practiced in the courts-and then an incorrect notice document was sent
to the responding parties by accident.
Id.
275. Bartholet Deposition, supra note 261, at 44.
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different state judges might differently be[,] but with arbitrators you
have people for whom to some degree the job of decision making is
a job that they may or may not get the next day, the next week, the
next year as opposed to judges who have regular business and
regular salaries[,] so I argued to her [Colleen Askvig], as I tried to
argue to Kelly Broberg also, that there was-that this preemptory
challenge rule had the potential for unfairness in a different way in
the arbitration process and that NAF was in a position to see that
happening as I had seen it happen and to do something about it in its
rules by[,] for example[,I changing the preemptory challenge
process." 276
Professor Bartholet never arbitrated for NAF again. She sent a letter of
resignation to NAF as a result of her belief that NAFs system was "systematically
biased in favor of the credit card companies ,,277 She did not know exactly
what was going on, but she felt she knew enough to remove-or in essence,
recuse-herself from future cases. 2 7 8
What does Professor Bartholet's deposition testimony suggest about the
extent to which the average person would have been able to continue to hold the
balance nice, clear and true under the circumstances presented? Professor
Bartholet is not an average woman. She is a Harvard Law School professor with
276. Id. at 47, 116.
277. Id. at 15.
278. My colleague, Professor Ray Campbell, has suggested that, just as many
evolutionary processes can be understood in terms of game theory (i.e., if organisms with a
certain characteristic are more likely to survive in a given challenging environment, that
characteristic will tend to become dominant after a very few iterations), NAFs or the credit-
card companies' alleged selection of arbitrators with particular characteristics also would be
likely to impact the arbitrator pool after a few iterations:
In the strong case, assume that NAF or some similar party only selects
arbitrators that bring in decisions in favor of the credit card companies.
Think of it as there being two kinds of arbitrators, which we will call
hawks (pro credit card companies) and doves (pro consumer) to track the
language of standard game theory ... If the only strategy that gets you to
the next round is to be a hawk, pretty soon the dove gene disappears..
Note that this happens without consciousness on the part of the hawks
and doves that the game is being played. Now, think of a less absolute
game-let's say the hawk gene wins 95% of the time, and the dove gene
wins 5%. If you work through the game theory, at some mix both genes
survive, but one will predominate. The point is, it doesn't matter that the
arbitrators knew about NAF[']s relationship with the collection agencies.
What matters is that those selecting arbitrators knew, and [allegedly]
selected arbitrators with a bias.
E-mail from Ray Campbell to Nancy Welsh (Nov. 23, 2009) (on file with author). This
further suggests the need to deal with "garden variety" bias promptly in certain settings
because a laissez-faire response threatens to permit "exceptional" bias to emerge fairly
quickly, especially when there are large volumes of cases and the turn-around time is short.
Similarly, dominance of a particular gene will emerge much more quickly in the insect
world, characterized by extreme fecundity, than among mammals, which tend to reproduce
more slowly.
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substantial experience as an arbitrator with other well-respected organizations and
with a national reputation in her field. She did not need her relationship with NAF
in order to be recognized, respected, and hired as an arbitrator. And though nearly
every academic feels underpaid, it would be difficult to believe that she was
desperate for the income she could earn from NAF. How would the average man
or woman, in contrast to Professor Bartholet, have responded to repeated
misrepresentations in NAF's letters and the repeated decisions of credit-card
companies to dismiss their cases rather than appear before him or her?
This is a close call-much closer than in the situation presented by
Caperton. And that is significant. Justice Kennedy repeatedly emphasizes the
"extraordinary" and "extreme" nature of Caperton's events. 7 It is a tale of epic
greed and hubris. The tale of NAF and Accretive/Agora may turn out to be a
similarly salacious tale, but NAF arbitrators did not know about these transactions
among NAF, Accretive/Agora, Mann Bracken, and Axiant. Once the focus shifts
to the individual NAF arbitrator, the scale changes dramatically, at least from the
perspective of a third-party observer. And that is the perspective that must be used
when applying the objective standard announced in Caperton.
Even though the allegations and testimony described in this Article
suggest that the average person arbitrating consumer credit-card disputes would
have been tempted not to hold his or her balance nice, clear and true, the risk of
bias does not seem "overwhelming" enough under Caperton to constitute an
unconstitutional violation of due process. And perhaps our inquiry should end
there.
However, Caperton was not the first case in which the Supreme Court
found that money, despite the indirectness of its flow, created a constitutionally
intolerable risk of bias. The Supreme Court has faced this issue before, in a string
of cases involving mayor-judges and other administrative decisionmakers. This
Article will now examine these cases before reaching a final conclusion about the
application of Caperton's objective standard to an average man or woman serving
as an NAF arbitrator-or to NAF itself.
IV. RECONSIDERING THE PRECEDENTIAL SHOULDERS UPON
WHICH CA PER TON STANDS
The recent due process cases arising out of the detention of alleged enemy
combatants in the War on Terror 2 80 showcase the federal judiciary's struggle to
maintain its role in response to attempts by the legislature and executive to avoid
the adjudicative function or exercise this function themselves .2 8 ' These cases could
279. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2265 (2009).
280. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507 (2004); see also Boumnediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
281. See Stephen 1. Vladeck, Boumediene 's Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and
the Separation of Powers, 84 NOMRE DAME L. REv. 2107, 2 149-50 (2009) ("More
generally, it might be impossible to understand the current structure of our judicial system,
and the limits on how it might be altered, without appreciating the separation of powers
concerns that arise when tribunals other than the Article Ill courts are in a position to have
the final say-and when access to the Article Ill courts is denied.").
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suggest that the Constitution's protections should be invoked only in the event of
epic transgressions. The Supreme Court's earlier due process jurisprudence, upon
which Caperton stands, demonstrates that due process protections should be
invoked even in the face of mere "garden variety" incidents of structural bias.
Caperton dealt with a judge on a state's highest court, but much of the
precedent upon which Justice Kennedy relied arose out of the challenges presented
by federal, state, or local administrators acting essentially as trial judges. In an
influential series of lectures published as a book, Professor Roscoe Pound
described adjudication by such administrators as an affront to the spirit of the
common law.28 He viewed this form of adjudication as the embodiment of a
totally different theory of lawmaking, based on abstract theory and application of
bureaucratic rules, rather than grounded in careful and customized analysis of
complex human experience. 2 8 3  Another difference, of course, is that
administrators' primary role requires them to focus on their agency's chosen
course of action and its economic and political survival, while judges are supposed
to be shielded by tenure and temperament to be disinterested, impartial, and
focused on the needs of the cases and parties before them. 2 8 4
This Part examines due process concerns that have arisen regarding
adjudicators' ability to maintain sufficient disinterest and impartiality in three
related, but distinct, administrative settings: (1) when it appears that an individual
administrator-judge may be unconstitutionally biased as a result of his own
pecuniary or personal interests or his shared identity with the interests of his
institution; (2) when it appears that an entire administrative adjudicative entity
may be unconstitutionally biased as a result of the pecuniary or personal interests
of the entity itself or the shared pecuniary or personal interests of the entity's
individual members; and (3) when an administrative entity has pecuniary or
personal interests in its allocation of benefits and has delegated decision-making
and the adjudication of resulting disputes to private con tractors. The first category
is, of course, most like Caperton, at least as the situation was framed by Justice
Kennedy. Justice Benjamin had a personal interest in winning (and thus funding)
his election campaign, and this led to the perception that his decision was biased.
The last category, due to its outsourcing of the adjudicative function to private
actors, bears the greatest resemblance to the situation involving the credit-card
industry, NAF and its arbitrators. All three categories of cases, however, may
provide additional guidance in considering the application of due process
requirements to NAF and its individual arbitrators.
A. The Temptation of the Individual Administrator-Judge Not to Hold the
Balance Nice, Clear, and True
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court confronted Ohio mayors acting as
judges pursuant to a state statute and effectively using their role to supplement
282. See ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIHiT OF THE COMMON LAW (192 1).
283. See id.
284. We know, of course, that this image is not-and probably never
was-accurate. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)
(establishing the courts' unique ability "to say what the law is").
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their own or their municipality's income. In Tumey v. Ohio, 2 8 5 the mayor-judge
personally received a portion of the fines he assessed for violations of the state's
prohibition law. The Supreme Court found this to be a clear violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the mayor had a "direct,
personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against" each
criminal defendant. 2 8 6 The Court invoked norms of judicial behavior, noting that
"officers acting in a judicial or c~asi-judicia1 capacity" must excuse themselves if
they have a pecuniary interest. 87 Administrative adjudicators like this mayor-
judge were to be held to the same standards as judges, and judges were not
permitted to have a pecuniary interest in the verdict.
As noted above, Tumey was the source of the language invoked by Justice
Kennedy in Caperton regarding the need to consider whether organizational
procedures or structures "offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge
to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might
lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the state and the
accused."2 8 8 Regarding the argument that the amount of money at issue in the
particular case before the court was relatively small and thus undeserving of due
process consideration, the Court opined:
There are doubtless mayors who would not allow such consideration
as $12 costs in each case to affect their judgment in it, but the
requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure is not
satisfied by the argument that men of the highest honor and the
greatest sel sacrifice could carry it on without danger of
injustice. 8
Thus, regardless of the amount at issue, if administrators were serving in an
adjudicative role, they were obligated to behave like judges and avoid the
temptation of bias.
In 1928, just one year after Tumey was decided, the Court dealt with a
second Ohio mayor .2 90 Although this mayor also acted as a judge pursuant to
Ohio's statute, he was on a fixed salary and did not receive direct compensation
based on his decisions . 29 1 He also was just one member of a five-person
commission that exercised legislative powers while the city manager exercised
executive powers. 2 9 2 Based on these circumstances, which helped to insulate the
mayor-judge from direct responsibility for the finances and fiscal policies of the
city, the Court determined that it could not presume that this mayor would be
285. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
286. Idat 524.
287. Id. at 523.
288. Id. at 532 (quoted in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252,
2265 (2009)).
289. Id. (emphasis added).
290. Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928).
291. Id. at 61.
292. Idat 63.
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unconstitutionally biased toward the conviction of those who came before him as
judge. 9
Many years passed before the next Ohio mayor appeared before the
Supreme Court. During that time, Congress established a vast web of federal
agencies to implement the New Deal, fight World War 11, and manage the home
front. Congress also passed the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).~9 To help
protect the impartiality of adjudicators in formal adjudicative proceedings, the
APA established certain salary and employment protections for administrative law
judges .2 9 5 In the midst of another growth spurt of the administrative state in the
1 970s, the Supreme Court decided Goldberg v. Kelly,29 which specifically
identified an impartial tribunal as an essential element of the due process to be
provided by administrative agencies. 2 9 7 This element, however, was not the focus
of the case.
In 1972, in Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 9 the Supreme Court dealt
with its third Ohio mayor serving as a judge. Like the second mayor, he did not
receive any personal income from the fines he assessed .2 9 9 Also like the second
mayor, he merely had an interest in the financial health of his village.300 But this
mayor was required to "account[] annually to the [village] council respecting
village finances," 30' and "[a] major part of village income [was] derived from the
fines, forfeitures, costs, and fees imposed by him in his mayor's court." 0  The
evidence showed that between 1964 and 1968 such fines accounted for at least
35% and sometimes more than 50% of the village's revenues. 30 3 The mayor had
even directed the chief of police to charge suspects under village ordinances, rather
than state statutes, whenever possible in order to insure the flow of monies to the
village's coffers. 304Despite this evidence, Ohio's Supreme Court had found that
the mayor did not have the sort of "direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest"
that paralleled the situation in Tumey and that the village's reliance on the income
generated by the mayor's court did "not mean that a mayor's impartiality is so
diminished thereby that he cannot act in a disinterested fashion in a judicial
capacity." 305
293. Id. at 65.
294. See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure
Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1557 (1996).
295. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 5362, 4301 (1978) (providing for separation of
adjudicative, investigative, and prosecutorial functions, removing agency control over
tenure and compensation decisions, and exempting ALJs from certain performance ratings).
The protections are not provided to hearing examiners or other non-A-LJs.
296. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
297. Id. at 271 ("And, of course, an impartial decision maker is essential.").
298. 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
299. Id. at 59-60.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 58.
302. Id.
303. See id.
304. Id. at 59.
305. Id.
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A majority of the U.S. Supreme Court was not so trusting of the mayor's
ability to maintain his detachment and impartiality under these circumstances.
First, the Court declared that "[tlhe fact that the mayor [in Tumey] . . . shared
directly in the fees and costs did not define the limits of the principle" regarding
the relationship between impartiality and the guarantee of due process of law.30
Second, the Court reasserted the test that had been used in Tumey: "whether the
mayor's situation is one 'which would offer a possible temptation to the average
man as a ]udge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or
which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the state
and the accused."' 3 0 ' Third, the Court applied this test and found that based on the
circumstances presented:
Plainly that "possible temptation" may also exist when the mayor's
executive responsibilities for village finances may make him
partisan to maintain the high level of contribution from the mayor's
court. This, too, is a "situation in which an official perforce occupies
two practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and
the other judicial, (and) necessarily involves a lack of due process of
law in the trial of defendants charged with crimes before him."308
The Court also rejected the adequacy of the two procedural safeguards
that the village proffered. The first was an Ohio statutory provision that permitted
309the disqualification of interested, biased, or prejudiced judges in particular cases.
The petitioner had apparently failed to object under this provision. 3 0 The Court
brushed aside this statute for a variety of reasons. Most significantly, the Court
objected to the requirement that the petitioner present evidence overcoming a
presumption of judicial impartiality: "If this means that an accused must show
special prejudice in his particular case, the statute requires too much and protects
too little.""' 1 The village also noted that an unfair procedure in the mayor's court
could be corrected on appeal to the County Court of Common Pleas, where the
standard of review was de novo. 3 1 2 An apparently outraged Supreme Court
objected to the suggestion that due process could be met by eventual justice: "Nor,
in any event, may the State's trial court procedure be deemed constitutionally
acceptable simply because the State eventually offers a defendant an impartial
adjudication. Petitioner is entitled to a neutral and detached judge in the first
instance."313
Dissenting Justice White, who had been Deputy Attorney General at the
U.S. Department of Justice before joining the Supreme Court, certainly understood
that Tumey was being extended beyond the simple principle that an official may
not serve as the judge in a case in which he has a direct financial stake in the
306. Id at 60.
307. Id. (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)) (emphasis added).
308. Id. (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 534) (emphasis added).
309. Idat 61.
310. Id
311. Id.
312. Id
313. Id. at 61-62.
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outcome. 3 14 He also understood that in Ward a majority of the Court refuised to
presume the impartiality of an official who was a public, yet still embedded,
neutral. 1 Justice White wrote:
To justify striking down the Ohio system on its face, the
Court must assume either that every mayor-judge in every case will
disregard his oath and administer justice contrary to constitutional
commands or that this will happen often enough to warrant the
prophylactic, per se rule urged by petitioner. I can make neither
assumption with respect to Ohio mayors nor with respect to similar
officials in 16 other States. Hence, I would leave the due process
matter to be decided on a case-by-case basis ... 31
In Ward, a majority of the Justices were uncomfortable with the Ohio
statute in that it invited biased decision-making by city officials struggling to fill
local coffers and please their constituents. The structural procedure provided by
the statute and the fiscal pressures of the city officials created an unconstitutional
probability of bias. Justice White, who indicated more trust in the integrity and the
ability of these officials to withstand temptation, would have required an objection
and proof that the officials were accepting the structural invitation.
These cases-Tumey, Dugan, and Ward-are all generally consistent
with Caperton's emphasis upon the need for adjudicators to avoid circumstances
that will tempt them to issue biased decisions. What is striking, however, is the
degree to which the Supreme Court in these cases went out of its way to:
(1) preempt what it viewed as illegitimate proceedings rather than require the
complaining citizen to prove that he had suffered from a decision tainted by actual
bias, (2) avoid establishing a presumption of impartiality for these neutrals, and
(3) refuse to require extreme circumstances in order to find an unconstitutional
probability of bias. Instead, the Court was quite ready to be proactive in asserting a
constitutional obstacle to "garden variety" temptation of individual administrative
adjudicators, perhaps in order to "nip in the bud" the potential for extraordinary
temptation.
B. The Temptation of an Entire Administrative-Adjudicative Body Not to Hold
the Balance Nice, Clear, and True
As the administrative state continued to grow, the Supreme Court
confronted the potential for structural bias in the design of an entire
administrative-adjudicative body. Probably due to the consequences of finding an
entire body's decision-making to be unconstitutional, these cases present a more
nuanced and complex picture regarding the Court's willingness to be assertive in
assuring sufficient impartiality in administrative adjudication.
Gibson v. Berryhill,317 decided by the Supreme Court in 1973 on the heels
of Ward, seems to represent the high water mark in required impartiality from
embedded neutrals. There, the Supreme Court examined the impartiality of an
314. Id. at 62 (White, J., dissenting).
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
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entire state board. The factual details here-like the details in Caperton-are
important because these details seem to have played a significant role in the
Court's ultimate decision.
At the center of this action was a group of optometrists who practiced as
employees of a company-Lee Optical-rather than as independent
optometrists. 3 18 These optometrist-employees faced potential revocation of their
licenses by the Alabama Board of Optometry. 319 The Alabama Optometric
Association, whose membership was limited to independent practitioners of
optometry, had filed charges against Lee Optical's optometrist-employees
following the repeal and amendment of a relevant state statute.320 The Association
apparently had urged that the amendment of the statute (which removed reference
to commercial stores' operation of optical departments) made it illegal to practice
optometry as an employee of a business corporation and also argued that such
employment violated the Association's professional ethics rules.32
Just two days after the Association filed its charges with the Alabama
Board of Optometry, the Board brought its own action in state court against Lee
Optical and thirteen of its optometrist-employees. 322 According to Justice White,
who wrote the majority opinion for the Supreme Court, the conduct cited by the
Board as the basis for its claims against the optometrists was "very similar to that
charged by the Association in its complaint to the Board."323 The state court
dismissed the Board's claims against the individual optometrist-employees, but
enjoined Lee Optical from practicing optometry and employing licensed
optometrists.32 The optometrist-employees would no longer have jobs. The
company appealed.
By the time these events had elapsed, nearly six years had passed since
the Association had filed its original charges before the Board. While the state
action proceeded at the trial court level, the Board suspended its own proceedings
against the optometrist-employees. 325 But after winning injunctive relief against
Lee Optical in state court, the Board "reactivated" those proceedings and
scheduled a series of hearings. 326 The optometrist-employees now countered with
their own action in federal court, seeking an injunction against the hearings. 2
They claimed that because membership of the Board was statutorily limited to
members of the Alabama Optometric Association-whose membership was
318. Id. at 567.
319. Idat 568.
320. This statute had formerly been understood to permit the existence of
commercial stores with optical departments under the direction of optometrist-employees.
See id. at 565-66.
321. Id. at 568.
322. The Board sought to enjoin Lee Optical from engaging in the unlawful
practice of optometry and claimed that the optometrist-employees were aiding and abetting
the company in its illegal activities. See id at 568-69.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 569.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id
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limited to independent optometrists-"the Board was biased and could not provide
the plaintiffs with a fair and impartial hearing in conformity with due process of
law."328 The federal district court agreed with the optometrist-employees and
enjoined the Board's hearings. 329 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Similar to the defendant village in Ward, the Board had apparently argued
that the optometrist-employees should be required to participate in the hearings
before they could object to them as unconstitutional .330 The Supreme Court
disagreed, noting that if the Board was "incompetent by reason of bias to
adjudicate the issues pending before it," 33' then the Court was "also correct that it
need not defer to the Board." 3  Also similar to the defendant village in Ward, the
Board had apparently argued that the optometrist-employees' federal action was
not ripe because any potential deficiency in the Board's proceedings would be
cured by de novo judicial review by a state court. 333 The Supreme Court also
rejected that argument, but for unclear reasons. 3 3 4 The federal district court had
concluded "that to require the Plaintiffs to resort to the protection offered by state
law in these cases would effectively deprive them of their property, that is, their
right to practice their professions, without due process of law and that irreparable
injury would follow in the normal course of events." 3
In the majority opinion, Justice White carefully summarized the reasoning
of the district court, which had applied the test established in Ward to the
particular factual circumstances before it in order to find the Board's proceedings
unconstitutional:
For the District Court, the inquiry was not whether the Board
members were 'actually biased but whether, in the natural course of
events, there is an indication of a possible temptation to an average
man sitting as a judge to try the case with bias for or against any
issue presented to him' .. ... Such a possibility of bias was found to
arise in the present case from a number of factors. First, was the fact
that the Board, which acts as both prosecutor and judge in
delicensing proceedings, had previously brought suit against the
plaintiffs on virtually identical charges in the state courts. This the
District Court took to indicate that members of the Board might
have "preconceived opinions" with regard to the cases pending
before them. Second, the court found as a fact that Lee Optical Co.
328. Id. at 570.
329. Id.
330. Id at 574-75.
331. Id. at 577.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. ("Nor, in these circumstances, would a different result be required simply
because judicial review, de novo or otherwise, would be forthcoming at the conclusion of
the administrative proceedings."). In footnote 16, Justice White observed that the district
court had found that the revocation of the employee-optometrists' licenses along with the
inevitable attendant publicity would result in irreparable damage to the appellees for which
no adequate remedy would be afforded by state law. Id at 577 n. 16.
335. Id. at 57 1-72 (quoting Berryhill v. Gibson, 331 F.Supp. 122, 126 (M.D. Ala.
1971)).
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did a large business in Alabama, and that if it were forced to
suspend operations the individual members of the Board, along with
other private practitioners of optometry, would fall heir to this
business. Thus, a serious question of a personal financial stake in
the matter in controversy was raised. Finally, the District Court
appeared to regard the Board as a suspect adjudicative body in the
cases then pending before it, because only members of the Alabama
Optometric Association could be members of the Board, and
because the Association excluded from membership optometrists
such as the plaintiffs who were employed by other persons or
entities. The result was that 92 of the 192 practicing optometrists in
Alabama were denied participation in the governance of their own
336profession.
The Supreme Court showed deference to the federal district court while
explicitly sidestepping the opportunity here to address the per se constitutionality
of administrative agencies' combination of investigative and adjudicatory
functions. Instead, the Court noted the split within the federal courts on this issue
and deferred its disposition of that issue until another day. 337 Specifically, the
Court affirmed the federal district court's finding of unconstitutionality based on
the second and third of the three factors identified by the district court above.
Interestingly, Justice White combined these factors into one-the "ground of
possible personal interest" 338-by observing that optometrists-employees
"1accounted for nearly half of all the optometrists practicing in Alabama" 339 while
"the Board of Optometry was composed solely of optometrists in private practice
for their own account.,,4 As a result:
[T]he Board's efforts [which would result in revocation of the
licenses of all optometrist-employees, not just those employed by
Lee Optical] would possibly redound to the personal benefit of
members of the Board, sufficiently so that in the opinion of the
District Court, the Board was constitutionally disqualified from
hearing the charges filed against the appellees. 34 1
Justice White then cited Tumey and Ward for the principle that "those with
substantial pecuniary interest in legal proceedings should not adjudicate those
disputes" 342 and added that Ward "indicates that the financial stake need not be as
direct or positive as it appeared to be in Tumey. ,33Ultimately, Justice White and a
majority of the Supreme Court stood ready to defer to the district court's
conclusion:
336. Id. at 571 (quoting Berryhill v. Gibson, 331 F. Supp. at 125) (citation
omitted).
337. Id579-80.
338. Id. at 579.
339. Id. at 578.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. I1d. at 579.
343. Id.
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[T]he pecuniary interest of the members of the Board of Optometry
had sufficient substance to disqualify them, given the context in
which this case arose. As remote as we are from the local realities
underlying this case and it being very likely that the District Court
has a firmer grasp of the facts and of their significance to the issues
presented, we have no good reason on this record to overturn its
conclusion and we affirm it.344
Although Justice White was not ready to assume the bad faith of state
administrators based on the mere appearance of partiality, he was apparently
persuaded by the evidence gathered and presented that the average independent
optometrist on the Board of Optometry would be unconstitutionally tempted not to
hold the balance nice, clear and true when confronting the extent of the financial
spoils available in Alabama.
There are certainly parallels among the Board of Optometry in Gibson,
the mayoral office in Ward, and NAF. Each had a direct pecuniary interest in
adjudicating the dispute(s) at hand. But unlike the situations presented in Ward and
Gibson, NAF had a somewhat less direct interest in the outcome of particular cases
and shielded its individual arbitrators from knowledge of the extent of its likely
financial interest in arbitral outcomes that were favorable to the repeat players.
Perhaps NAF did this for altruistic reasons, to protect the integrity of its arbitration
services. Or perhaps NAF did this because it did not want its arbitrators to
compare the income they earned in conducting hearings and issuing awards to the
income earned by NAF's principals in creating, managing, and promoting their
arbitrators' services. The truth likely lies somewhere in between, and it is not clear
that NAF's intent matters at all to our legal analysis.
However, with Arnett v. Kennedy, 4 the Supreme Court's assertive
protection of the impartiality of administrative adjudicative bodies began to
change. The Court began to express more explicit deference to such bodies and
presume their impartiality until evidence proved that such a presumption was not
deserved. In this case, a nonprobationary federal employee, Wayne Kennedy,
brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief claiming that he had been
denied the right to free speech and due process when he was discharged from the
Chicago Regional Office of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO).34 6
Wendell Verduin, the Regional Director of the OEO, presented Kennedy with a
"Notification of Proposed Adverse Action" and listed five charges, including one
that Kennedy had publicly accused Verduin and his administrative assistant of
attempting to bribe a representative of a community action organization with an
offer of a $100,000 grant of OEO funds if the representative would sign a
344. Id. (emphasis added); see also Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 204-06
(1985) (holding that members of committee that presided over prison disciplinary
proceedings were entitled to qualified immunity only because the committee was composed
of members of the prison staff rather than "professional hearing officers" who were "truly
independent" and the hearings "contained few of the procedural safeguards" that
characterized administrative hearings in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)).
345. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
346. Id. at 136-37.
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statement against Kennedy and another OBO employee.34 Kennedy asserted his
"right to a trial-type hearing before an impartial hearing officer before he could be
removed from his emlyet.. Verduin notified Kennedy in writing of his
removal. Kennedy appealed directly to the Civil Service Commission and brought
suit in federal district court .3 4 9 A three-judge panel granted Kennedy summary
judgment, finding that the discharge procedure authorized by the Lloyd-La Follette
Act for the removal of non-probationary federal employees and accompanying
Civil Service Commission and OEO regulations denied Kennedy due process of
law for the failure to provide "for the decision on removal or suspension to be
made by an impartial agency official, or for Kennedy (by his own means) to
present witnesses; or for his right to confront adverse witnesses." 350
A majority of the Supreme Court concluded that Kennedy's due process
rights had not been violated, but there was no majority for the reasoning
underlying that judgment. 3 5 1 Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice and
only one other justice, found that though Congress had chosen to provide federal
employees with substantive right of job security under the Lloyd-LaFollette Act,
Congress had also chosen in the same Act (even the same sentence) to limit the
procedural protections afforded to enforce the right. 35 2 "[W]e decline to conclude
that the substantive right may be viewed wholly apart from the procedure provided
for its enforcement,"353 he added, "where the grant of a substantive right is
inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be
employed in determining that right, a litigant in the position of appellee must take
the bitter with the sweet.",3 54 According to these three Justices, Kennedy's
employer was not required to provide any adjudicator other than Verduin or any
process other than the one provided. 5
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred but found that
Kennedy did have a property interest in continued employment absent "cause" and
356
was therefore entitled to due process under the Constitution. However, he also
found-based on an assessment of the private interest affected by the deprivation
and the Government's interest in summary removal-that a post-removal
347. Id. at 137.
348. Id. Kennedy also took advantage of his right under regulations promulgated
by the Civil Service Commission to reply to the charges, hut did not respond to their
substance except to note that his conversations had been "inaccurately set forth in the
adverse action." Id. at 138 n.2.
349. Id. at 138.
350. Id. at 176-77. The Civil Service Commission regulations provided, among
other things, that an employee "shall have an opportunity to appear before the official
vested with authority to make the removal decision in order to answer the charges against
him" and the right to appeal which will involve an evidentiary trial-type hearing. "[I]f the
employee is reinstated on appeal, he receives full back pay, less any amounts earned by him
through other employment during that period." Id. at 143-46.
351. Idatl163.
352. Id. at 152.
353. I1d.
354. Id. at 153-54.
355. Id. at 163.
356. Id. at 166-67 (Powell, J., concurring).
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evidentiary hearing available to Kennedy represented a reasonable accommodation
and met the due process requirement of an impartial decisionmaker. 3" He found
no requirement of an impartial decisionmaker at the pre-removal stage, based
either on the relevant statutes or the Constitution. 358
Justice White, who had counseled for the presumption of respect for
administrative decisionmakers in the past, concurred in part and dissented in
part .359 Like Justices Powell and Blackmun, he disagreed with Justice Rehnquist's
assertion that Congress could condition the grant of a substantive right upon the
acceptance of otherwise-unconstitutional procedural limitations."36 Rather,
"[w]hile the State may define what is and what is not pr-operty, once having
defined those rights the Constitution defines due process, and as I understand it six
members of the Court are in agreement on this fundamental proposition."361 Justice
White went on to find, however, that the relevant statutory and regulatory
requirements of thirty days advance notice and the right to make written
presentation satisfied the minimal requirements of the Due Process Clause. Then
he tumned to the demand for an impartial decisionmaker. Very interestingly, he
found an unconstitutionally high risk of partiality in this case:
Fairness and accuracy are not always threatened simply because the
hearing examiner is the supervisor of the employee, or, as in this
case, the Regional Director over many employees, including
appellee. But here the hearing official was the object of slander that
was the basis for the employee's proposed discharge . .. . In ruling
that the employee was to be terminated, the hearing examiner's own
reputation, as well as the efficiency of the service, was at stake; and
although Mr. Verduin may have succeeded, in fact, in disassociating
his own personal feelings from his decision as to the interests of
OEO, the risk and the appearance that this was not the case were too
great to tolerate. In such situations the official normally charged
with the discharge decision need only recuse and transfer the file to
a person qualified to make the initial decision. We need not hold
that the Lloyd-La Follette Act is unconstitutional for its lack of
provision for an impartial hearing examiner. Congress is silent on
the matter. We would rather assume, because of the constitutional
problems in not so providing, that, if faced with the question (at
362least on the facts of this case) Congress would have so provided.
Ultimately, Justice White stated that he would order reinstatement and back pay,
due to the failure to provide an impartial hearing officer at the pre-termination
hearing. 363
357. Id at 170-71.
358. Id. at 170 n.5 ("In my view the relevant fact is that an impartial
decisionmaker is provided at the post-removal hearing where the employee's claims are
finally resolved.").
359. Id at 171 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
360. Id. at 177.
361. Id. at 185.
362. Id. at 199 (emphasis added).
363. Id. at 202.
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Justice Marshall dissented and was joined by Justices Douglas and
Brennan. 364After a thorough review of the procedural due process jurisprudence,
the dissenters noted that a majority of the Court rejected Rehnquist's argument that
Kennedy's statutory entitlement could be conditioned on a statutory limitation of
procedural due process protections. 6 Justice Marshall found that removal from
employment represented a very significant deprivation and thus, Kennedy should
have received the opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses, etc.36 He
added:
It also seems clear that for the hearing to be meaningful,
the hearing officer must be independent and unbiased and his
decision be entitled to some weight. We addressed the importance
of this element of due process in Goldberg . .. where we found the
requirements of due process were not met by the review of a welfare
termination decision by a caseworker who was, in effect, also the
complainant. . . . The need for an independent decisionmaker is
particularly crucial in the public employment context, where the
reason for the challenged dismissal may well be related to some
personal antagonism between the employee and his superior, as
appears to be the case here. 36 7
The dissent then focused on the timing of a full evidentiary hearing before
an impartial decisionmaker-which was the central issue before the court. Later,
however, Justice Marshall returned to the need for an impartial decisionmaker:
The Regional Director assembled the evidence against appellee,
proposed the dismissal, then decided it should be effected; he acted
as complaining witness, prosecutor, and judge. The meaningless
bureaucratic paper shuffling afforded appellee before his discharge
would surely not alone satisfy the stringent demands of due process
when such an important interest is at stake. The decisions of this
Court compel the conclusion that a worker with a claim of
entitlement to public employment absent specified cause has a
property interest protected by the Due Process Clause and therefore
the right to an evidentiary 38hearing before an impartial
decisionmaker prior to dismissal.36
For our purposes, it is important to remember that a majority concluded
that Kennedy's employer had not violated his due process rights. It is also
important to note that only four Justices expressed concemn regarding Verduin's
likely bias, and that these concerns required careful consideration of the facts and
human dynamics involved in the situation. On the other hand, it is quite interesting
that Justice White, a former federal administrator, was one of the four Justices who
had serious concerns about impartiality.
364. Id at 206. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
365. Id. at 211.
366. Id at 226-27.
367. Id. at 216.
368. Id. at 226-27.
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Justice White had the opportunity to retumn to a defense of the integrity
and authority of state-appointed decisionmakers two years later in Withrow v.
Larkin, 36 9 which explicitly established a strong "presumption of honesty and
integrity in those serving as adjudicators. 3 7 0 This case is reminiscent of Gibson
because it involves another citizen claiming violation of his right to due process as
a result of adjudication by an administrative tribunal that he perceived as biased.
The disposition and resulting rule, however, are strikingly different. In Withrow, a
physician faced suspension of his license by the Wisconsin Medical Examining
Board, a body composed of practicing Wisconsin physicians. 3 7 1 The Board had
conducted an investigation of the physician and determined that there was
probable cause that he had violated criminal provisions and should have his license
revoked. 7 This physician's entire practice in Wisconsin consisted of performing
373abortions at his office in Milwaukee. The same Board then planned to hold a
contested hearing in order to determine whether to suspend the physician's
license .3 74 After a series of legal proceedings, a three-member federal district court
issued an order for preliminary injunctive relief that prevented the Board from
proceeding with its proposed contested hearing. 7 The district court explained:
[Flor the board temporarily to suspend Dr. Larkin's license at its
own contested hearing on charges evolving from its own
investigation would constitute denial to him of his rights to
procedural due process. Insofar as [the Wisconsin statute] authorizes
a procedure wherein a physician stands to lose his liberty or
property, absent the intervention of an independent, neutral and
detached decision maker, we concluded that it was unconstitutional
and unenforceable. 7
The district court later limited its decision to enjoin enforcement of the statute
against the physician in this case.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice White, disagreed
with the district court's assessment that the physician had a high probability of
success on his constitutional claim. Justice White dutifully cited to Tumey, Ward,
and In re Murchison and admitted that "various situations have been identified in
which experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the
judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. 7 But Justice
White then limited these situations to ones "in which the adjudicator has a
pecuniary interest in the outcome and in which he has been the target of personal
abuse or criticism from the party before him." 378 Justice White distinguished those
situations from the case before the Court, which involved only the combination of
369. 421 U.S. 35,47 (1975).
370. Id.
371. Id. at 3 8-3 9.
372. Id. at 39.
373. Id. at 38-3 9.
374. Id. at 39.
375. Id at 41.
376. Id. at 46.
377. Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
378. Id
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two different governmental functions, investigation and adjudication, and a
strongly held difference of opinion on moral issues. For a case such as this one,
Justice White established a strong presumption in favor of the fitness of those
serving as adjudicators-which would require substantial evidence for any
complainant to overcome:
The contention that the combination of investigative and
adjudicative funictions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of
bias in administrative adjudication has a much more difficult burden
of persuasion to carry. It must overcome a presumption of honesty
and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince
that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and
human weaknesses, conferring investigative and adjudicative
powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of
due process is to be adequately implemented."' 9
The Court's reference to "psychological tendencies and human
weaknesses" may have signaled openness to considering social psychological
evidence regarding the self-serving bias, 380 but other language in the opinion
underscored the heavy burden faced by anyone attempting to overcome the
presumption favoring adjudicators-provided that their alleged bias was based on
something other than pecuniary interest in the outcome or personal antagonism
between the decisioninaker and the person asserting a violation of due process.
For example, Justice White cited to the Supreme Court's decision in FTC
381vCement Institute, involving allegations of bias in an adjudicatory proceeding
by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The same Commission had previously
conducted an investigation regarding a pricing system used by the cement industry,
and certain Commission members had testified before Congress that they viewed
the pricing system as illegal. In contrast to the investigation, the FTC's
379. Id.
380. See Gregory N. Mandel, Technology Wars: The Failure of Democratic
Discourse, 11 MICH-. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 117, 164 (2005) ("A wealth of empirical
data reveal that people have irrationally high confidence in their judgments....
Overconfidence is not limited to lay judgment or experimental situations. Various studies
have found that experts often exhibit an overconfidence bias, and studies of real world,
professional predictions routinely confirm overconfidence as well."); see also Keith Allred,
Relationship Dynamics in Disputes: Replacing Contention with Cooperation, in TILE
HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 84 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds.,
2005) (describing several biases-naive realism, confirmatory bias, accuser and excuser
biases, and lone moderate effect-that "lead us to exaggerate other people's hostility and
unreasonableness [and] trigger cycles of suspicion and conflict escalation"); Rafeal Efrat,
Attribution Theory Bias and the Perception of Abuse in Consumer Bankruptcy, 10 GEO. J.
ON POVERTY L. & POL'y 205, 217 (2003) ("As a result of the failure to follow the objective
paradigm envisioned in the attribution theory, a person's perception of the cause of
another's behavior becomes vulnerable to a number of biases, thus becoming less
accurate."); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 457 (2003) ("[S]tudies
show that people who are very successful tend to be especially confident in their abilities.").
381. 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
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adjudicatory proceeding directly and fully involved members of the cement
industry who were permitted to present evidence and conduct cross-examination.
Justice White approvingly quoted the following language from the Supreme
Court's opinion in FTC v. Cement Institute: "[T]he fact that the Commission had
entertained such views [that the pricing system at issue was illegal] as the result of
its prior ex ante investigations did not necessarily mean that the minds of its
members were irrevocably closed on the subject of the respondents' basing point
practices." 382 Later in the Withrow opinion, Justice White asserts:
No specific foundation has been presented for suspecting that the
Board had been prejudiced by its investigation or would be disabled
from hearing and deciding on the basis of the evidence to be
presented at the contested hearing. The mere exposure to evidence
presented in nonadversary investigative procedures is insufficient in
itself to impugn the fairness of the board members at a later [and
presumable sufficient] adversary hearing. Without a showing to the
contrary, state administrators "are assumed to be men of conscience
and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a 38 articular
controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances."3
Note the contrast between the tests used by the Court in judging the
impartiality-and integrity--of the Ohio mayors compared to the tests used for the
members of this Wisconsin board. In Tumey and Ward, the Court considered
whether the average (and presumably flawed) man would be able to hold the
balance "nice, clear and true." On the other hand, in Withrow, the Court envisioned
"men of conscience and intellectual discipline" and required evidence that the
adjudicators' minds were "irrevocably closed. 384 The mayors were assumed
incapable of detaching themselves sufficiently from their own financial interests,
and the financial interests of their constituents and neighbors, to provide a fair
procedure to an outsider. The members of the board were granted much greater
deference, even though they also were dealing with an outsider. Why this dramatic
difference in the trust and deference to these administrative adjudicators? The
answers are probably several, some embedded in the words of the opinions and
others found in the historical and cultural context of the time.
First, the Court seemed to perceive very different potential influences
upon these men. In Tumey and Ward, the Court was dealing with the powerful and
illegitimate influence of money-and men who had allowed themselves to be put
in this situation. In contrast, in Withrow, money-or access to this doctor's
patients-did not seem to be the--or even a-motivating factor. Instead, the
members of the board were behaving in a manner consistent with their own local
morals and principles.
Second and relatedly, the Court seemed to imagine very different sorts of
outsiders encountering difficulties with the local decisionmakers. In Tumey and
Ward, we find the innocent, hapless outsider who is exploited inappropriately by
382. Id. at 701 (emphasis added).
383. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 55 (quoting United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409,
421 (1941)) (emphasis added).
384. Id. at 48, 55.
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local officials. In Gibson, the innocent outsider may be Lee Optical, a corporation
just trying to serve a market in a different and perhaps less expensive manner, or
Lee Optical's optometrist-employees encountering professional discrimination
based only on their decision to ply their trade as employees rather than solo
practitioners. Withrow offered a dramatic contrast. Here, the outsider was flouting
a local profession's culture and strongly held personal values. Under this reading,
the members of the board were not exploiting or inappropriately discriminating
against anyone. They were defending their state from an incursion that they
viewed as harmful and immoral.
Third, there are institutional considerations. In Withrow, Justice White
noted that if the courts are to be permitted to function with some level of
efficiency, judges themselves could not fully live up to the absolutist expectations
expressed in Tumey and Ward. Again quoting from FTC v. Cement Institute,
Justice White wrote:
"No decision of this Court would require us to hold that it
would be a violation of procedural due process for a judge to sit in a
case after he had expressed an opinion as to whether certain types of
conduct were prohibited by law. In fact, judges frequently try the
same case more than once and decide identical issues each time,
although these issues involve questions both of law and fact.
Certainly, the Federal Trade Commission cannot possibly be under
stronger constitutional compulsions in this respect than a court."385
Justice White listed several additional examples of interim decision-
making by judges that did not disqualify judges from presiding over subsequent
proceedings. 8 For example, judges retry cases that have been reversed or
remanded; judges issue arrest warrants and then may preside over the subsequent
criminal trials; judges may issue or deny temporary restraining orders or
preliminary injunctions and then preside over the subsequent injunction
proceedings; judges rule on motions to dismiss or summary judgment motions and
then may preside over subsequent civil trials. If judges can be trusted to change
their minds in response to the fuill presentation of evidence, then why not extend
this trust to administrative adjudicators? "'.We find no warrant for imposing upon
administrative agencies a stiffer rule, whereby [administrative hearing] examiners
would be disentitled to sit because they ruled strongly against a party in the first
hearing."' 3 8 7 Reaching a preliminary decision and acting upon it does not imply an
inability to listen to a fuller explication of the case in the future-assuming, of
course, that such fuller explication occurs.
Indeed, the Court expressed faith in the existence of the "rational man,"
who will be painfully aware that his prior opinion is not fully informed and thus
will invite all parties to present, will listen carefully to the evidence they present,
and will intentionally permit himself to be persuaded to a contrary result if such a
result is justified by the evidence. The rational man, provided that he is neither
385. Id. at 48-49 (quoting FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702-03 (1948)).
386. Id. at 56-57.
387. Id. at 49 (quoting NLRB v. Donnelly Garment Co., 330 U.S. 219, 236-37
(1947)).
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psychologically nor economically committed to a particular outcome, is ready,
willing, and able to change his mind. Though the Court never specifically
referenced the "rational man," the opinion consistently returns to the psychological
question of whether this "rational man" characterizes administrative adjudicative
bodies .3 8 8 In the absence of concrete evidence that he does not exist-and thus, in
the absence of the influence of money or personal attacks, which are known to be
particularly potent to every man, regardless of his rationality-the Court presumes
the rational man's viability:
The risk of bias or prejudgment in this sequence of
fuinctions [investigation, followed by a finding of probable cause,
followed by a full and contested hearing] has not been considered to
be intolerably high or to raise a sufficiently great possibility that the
adjudicators would be so psychologically wedded to their
complaints that they would consciously or unconsciously avoid the
appearance of having erred or changed position. Indeed, just as there
is no logical inconsistency between a finding of probable cause and
an acquittal in a criminal proceeding, there is no incompatibility
between the agency filing a complaint based on probable cause and
a subsequent decision, when all the evidence is in, that there has
been no violation of the statute. Here, if the Board now proceeded
after an adversary hearing to determine that appellee's license to
practice should not be temporarily suspended, it would not
implicitly be admitting error in its prior finding of probable cause.
Its position most probably would merely reflect the benefit of a
more complete view of the evidence afforded by an adversary
hearing.'8
In a nod to Gibson, the Court also noted:
That the combination of investigative and adjudicative
functions does not, without more, constitute a due process violation,
does not, of course, preclude a court from determining from the
special facts and circumstances present in the case before it that the
risk of unfairness is intolerably high. Findings of that kind made by
judges with special insights into local realities are entitled to
respect, but injunctions resting on such factors should be
accompanied by at least the minimum findings required by Rules
52(a) and 65(d) .... 9
In Withrow, unlike Ward or Gibson, the allegation of prejudgment was
separated from an allegation of direct or indirect pecuniary interest or of personal
antagonism. Prejudgment alone, without a more compelling personal (or temporal)
stake, was not a sufficient basis for a finding of unconstitutionality. And according
to Tumey, Ward, and Gibson, pecuniary interest had to be concrete and relatively
substantial-even if it was indirect-in order to warrant a finding of
unconstitutionality.
388. See id.
389. Id. at 57-58.
390. Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
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Finally and perhaps most important, in Withrow, the Court references the
structural and administrative complexities presented by a growing welfare state. In
Richardson v. Perales,39 the Court had upheld a system in which the same Social
Security examiner conducted fact-finding and then made decisions regarding
disability claims. Justice White wrote: "[T]he challenge to this combination of
functions 'assumes too much and would bring down too many procedures
designed, and working well, for a governmental structure of great and growing
complexity."' 392 Later, he stated that "our cases, although they reflect the
substance of the problem [the combination of investigative and adjudicatory
functions], offer no support for the bald proposition applied in this case by the
District Court that agency members who participate in an investigation are
disqualified from adjudicating. The incredible variety of administrative
mechanisms in this country will not yield to any single organizing principle." 39
That last statement is incredibly frank. The administrative state and its procedures
had become too ubiquitous to permit them to fail. At the same time, these
administrative procedures presented problems for a country that was supposed to
be governed by the rule of law, not men.
The case of Mathews v. Eldridge , decided in 1976, underscored the
Supreme Court's increasingly instrumental view of procedure. Though Goldberg
v. Kelly was not explicitly overruled, its reach was severely curtailed. Mathews
established the three-part balancing test that we use today to determine whether the
procedure that has been used to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property
violates constitutional due process.3 9 The three factors to be considered are:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.'9
Obviously, this test explicitly recognized agencies' administrative and fiscal
concerns as a legitimate counterbalance to procedural purity and required the
plaintiff to demonstrate both sufficiently grievous harm and the likelihood of
erroneous deprivation. As was true with Goldberg, Mathews did not explicitly deal
with the issue of the impartiality of the decisionmaker, though the underlying facts
suggest that the decisionmakers there had made up their minds. 397 On the other
hand, there was no evidence of personal pecuniary interest influencing the
outcome. Ultimately, the Court found no violation of due process.
391. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
392. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 49-50 (quoting Richardson, 402 U.S. at 410).
393. Id. at 52.
394. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
395. Id. at 335.
396. Id.
397. See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of A Theory
of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28, 29 (1976).
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This series of cases is different from the first series discussed above
because the real defendants here are the agencies or decision-making tribunals as a
whole, not merely an individual adjudicator. The Court appears to tread much
more carefully in these cases, likely because finding a constitutional violation
could wreak havoc upon the entire administrative infrastructure. On the other
hand, the Court continues to find unconstitutionality if the claim of bias is based
on substantiated allegations of inappropriate pecuniary interest or strong personal
antagonism.
C. The Temptation of Case-Dependent Contractors Not to Hold the Balance
Nice, Clear and True
Schweiker v. McClure 398 is the last case that this Article will examine in
connection with the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence arising out of
allegations of partiality or bias. This case is particularly interesting because it
involves an agency's delegation of certain functions to private insurance carriers
which then outsourced the adjudicative function to individual hearing officers,
much as the credit-card companies outsourced arbitration to NAF which then
contracted with individual arbitrators.
In Schweiker, the agency involved was the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services. 399 The Department administered the Medicare program, which
consisted of two parts: Part A, which provided publicly-financed health insurance
to all older or disabled Americans regardless of their financial need, and Part B,
which existed to provide the "supplemental" benefits not provided by Part A.40
Participation in Part B was limited to those individuals who chose voluntarily to
enroll and to pay monthly premiums, but the U.S. Treasury also contributed to Part
B .401 The Court described Part B as "consequently resembl[ing] a private medical
insurance program that is subsidized in major part by the Federal Government. 0
Twenty seven million individuals participated in Part B at the time that Schweiker
was decided; 158 million claims had been processed in 1980; and on an annual
basis, the Department provided more than $10 billion in benefits (in 1982
dollars). 0
In 1965, Congress had authorized the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services to outsource the administration of this mammoth
program.404 According to the portions of the legislative record cited by the Court,
398. 456 U.S. 188 (1982); see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp.,
496 U.S. 633, 653 (1990) (noting that Due Process Clause had not been specifically invoked
and that statute at issue did not specifically require the procedural protections asserted by
LTV); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980) (stating that civil penalty system
and return of fines assessed by administrative law judge to federal agency did not violate
due process because it was "the administrative law judge, not the [Employment Standards
Adinistration], who performs the function of adjudicating child labor violations").
399. Schweiker, 456 U.S. at 189.
400. Id at 189-90.
401. Id at 190.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id
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Congress had done this in order to "make the administration of this sweeping
program more efficient 405 and "to take advantage of . .. insurance carriers' 'great
experience in reimbursing physicians."' 4 0 6 For California, the Secretary of Health
and Human Services had selected Blue Shield of California and the Occidental
Insurance Co. to process claims.40 The carriers were not named parties, though the
Supreme Court described them as agents of the agency.40 Presumably, these
carriers were paid for the services they performed on behalf of the agency, but
these financial arrangements were not described in the Court's opinion.
The Court was careful to point out that when Blue Shield or Occidental
determined whether to pay claims made under Part B, the carrier followed a
"precisely specified process" 409 and paid the claim "out of the Government's Trust
Fund-not out of its own pocket."4 1 0 Not surprisingly, the carriers did not grant
every claim for benefits. They provided any unhappy claimant with de novo
review, based on written evidence, by a carrier employee other than the employee
who had made the initial decision .4 1 1 If a claimant remained dissatisfied after this
initial review and had a claim worth at least $ 100, the claimant could proceed to an
oral hearing before a "hearing officer" who had not previously participated in the
case she was now adjudicating. 4 1 2 Importantly, the hearing officer's decision on
Part B claims was not subject to judicial rve.413
Three claimants, whose appeals were not granted by the carriers' hearing
officers,4 t brought a federal action against the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, claiming that the hearings violated their constitutional rights. 4 1 5 They
were then certified as representatives of a nationwide class. 4 16 The parties filed
cross-motions for summary judgment. 1 The federal district court granted the
class' motion based on the issues of partiality and unappealability and denied the
Secretary's motion on these issues, concluding that the "links between the carriers
and their hearing officers [were] sufficient to create a constitutionally intolerable
risk of hearing officer bias against claimants. 1  The district court relied on two
alternative rules of law: (1) that tribunals must be impartial in accordance with
405. Id
406. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 89-213, pt. 1, at 46 (1965)).
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 19 1.
410. Id.
411. Id
412. Id.
413. See McClure v. Harris, 503 F. Supp. 409, 418 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
414. One claimant was denied reimbursement for a sex change operation while
the second was denied partial reimbursement for the cost of an air ambulance because he
was taken to a specially equipped hospital rather than a hospital closer to his home. The
third claimant was denied reimbursement for an appendectomy because the hearing officer
reasoned that it was incidental to a cholecystectomy which was done at the same time.
Schweiker, 456 U.S. at 192 n.2.
415. Id at 192.
416. Id.
417. Id
418. Id. at 193.
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Tumey, and (2) that the sufficiency of due process depended upon the three-part
balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge. 4 19
The district court's decision appears to be grounded in the court's
conclusion that the "identity of interest" among the hearing officers, insurance
carriers, and Department was too strong. The carriers, of course, were operating
under contract with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The
carriers involved in disputes with claimants selected and appointed the hearing
officers to particular cases. The carriers largely trained the hearing officers. 420 The
hearing officers relied upon the carriers for their case-dependent incomes .42' most
strikingly, the court found that "five out of seven of Blue Shield's past and present
hearing officers '[were] former or current Blue Shield employees."' 422 Pointing to
other information in the record and returning to Withrow's dual presumption of
lack of bias by the administrative adjudicator and the complainant's burden of
proving a "disqualifying interest, ,43the Supreme Court disagreed with the district
court's decision to grant summary judgment:
Fairly interpreted, the factual findings made in this case do
not reveal any disqualifying interest under the standard of our cases.
The District Court relied almost exclusively on generalized
assumptions of possible interest, placing special weight on the
various connections of the hearing officers with the private
insurance carriers. The difficulty with this reasoning is that these
connections would be relevant only if the carriers themselves are
biased or interested We find no basis in the record for reaching
such a conclusion. As previously noted, the carriers pay all Part B
claims from federal, and not their own, funds. Similarly, the salaries
of the hearing officers are paid by the Federal Government. Further,
the carriers operate under contracts that require compliance with
standards prescribed by the statute and the Secretary. In the absence
of proof offinancial interest on the part of the carriers, there is no
basis for assuming a derivative bias among their hearing officers.42
Buried in footnotes, the Court also rejected other evidence proffered by
the claimants. For example, the claimants had asserted that the Secretary was
"biased in favor of inadequate Part B awards" based on the Department's
assistance to carriers in "identify[ing] medical providers who allegedly bill for
more services than are medically necessary" and its "wamn[ing to] carriers to
control overutilization of medical services. 2  This echoes the mayor of
Monroeville who urged the chief of police to consider the village's financial
situation when deciding whether to charge someone under a village ordinance or a
state statute.42 There was no evidence that the mayor asked the chief of police to
419. Id. at 192-93.
420. Id. at 193 n.4.
421. Id. at 192.
422. Id. at 193.
423. Id. at 196.
424. Id. at 196-97 (emphasis added).
425. Id. at 197 n.9.
426. See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
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charge someone unlawfully, only that he consider the financial implication when
deciding which charge to impose. In Schweiker, however, the Court required more
than this to find bias:
This action by the Secretary is irrelevant. It simply shows that he
takes seriously his statutory duty to ensure that only qualifyng Part
B claims are paid. . .. It does not establish that the Secretary has
sought to discourage payment of Part B claims that do meet Part B
requirements. Such an effort would violate Congress' direction.
427Absent evidence, it cannot be presumed.
The claimants also argued that "for reasons of psychology, institutional loyalty, or
carrier coercion, hearing officers would be reluctant to differ with carrier
determinations. ,48The Court rejected this claim by noting a lack of solid
evidence 4 29 and deferring to congressional wisdom in permitting the delegation of
public functions to private parties: "Such assertions require substantiation before
they can provide a foundation for invalidating an Act of Congress. 4 3 0 Finally, the
Court tersely asserted without explanation that "the fact that a hearing officer is or
was a carrier employee does not create a risk of partiality analogous to that
possibly arising from the professional relationship between a judge and a former
partner or associate.",4 3 1 It is a bit unclear why a judge would have more difficulty
resisting bias in an interaction with a former professional colleague than would an
employee in an interaction with her current employer-or a contractor in an
interaction with her current client-knowing that the employer or client must
operate within financial constraints. Nonetheless, the Court added, "We simply
have no reason to doubt that hearing officers will do their best to obey the
Secretary's instruction manual 4 3 2 including directives that "[lhe parties' interests
must be safeguarded to the full extent of their rights; in like manner, the
government's interest must be protected"; 4 3 3 and "[tlhe [hearing officer] must
make independent and impartial decisions . . . and be objective and free of any
influence which might affect impartial judgment as to the facts, while being
particularly patient with older persons and those with physical and mental
impairments."434
Perhaps this decision reflects the Court's belief in the detached expertise
of agencies and their delegates. One of the footnotes, for example, cited to a
portion of the Secretary of Human Services Instruction Manual that stated: "[tlhe
hearing is non-adversary in nature in that neither the carrier nor the Medicare
427. Schweiker, 456 U.S. at 197 n.9
428. Id.att197 n.10.
429. It is unclear how much discovery had been done prior to the filing of the
summary judgment motions in this case.
430. Schweiker, 456 U.S. at 197 n.10.
431. Idatl197 n.11.
432. Id
433. Id.
434. Id.
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Bureau is in opposition to the party but is interested only in seeing that a proper
decision is made." 3
One final piece of evidence, though, was almost undoubtedly central to
the Court's analysis. The lower court acknowledged that the Part B appellate
process "frequently result[ed] in reversal of the carrers' original dispositions"3
[Appellant] establish[es] that between 1975 and 1978, carriers
wholly or partially reversed, upon 'review determination,' their
initial determinations in 51-57 percent of the cases considered. Of
the adverse determination decisions brought before hearing officers,
42-51 percent of the carriers' decisions were reversed in whole or in
part. 43 7
If the hearing officers ruled against the carriers (in whole or in part)
approximately half of the time, how could they be presumed to be biased? The
proof, the Court seemed to say, was in the pudding.43
It is noteworthy that this case also involved application of the three-part
balancing test in Mathews. Apparently-and despite all of the risk factors already
identified-the lower court only cited to the hearing examiners' potential lack of
training and lack of threshold criteria such as a law degree as the basis for finding
a risk of erroneous deprivation .4 39 The Supreme Court scoffed at this analysis. The
lower court had not identified any "specific deficiencies in the Secretary's
selection criteria"; the evidence showed that the Secretary required the carrier to
use "qualified" individuals possessing "ability" and "thorough knowledge.""40
Last, the Court pointed to the information in the record regarding education and
experience of nine of the hearing officers, concluding that "[tlheir qualifications
tend to undermine rather than to support the contention that accuracy of Part B
decision-making may suffer by reason of carrier appointment of unqualified
hearing officers.""'1 Once again invoking a "strong presumption"-this time in
favor of the validity of congressional action and consistent with the Court's
recognition of "congressional solicitude for fair procedure"Q-the Court found
that the required showings of the second prong of the three-part balancing test had
not been met. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's granting of the
claimants' summary judgment motion. But the Court did even more than that-it
remanded for summary judgment to be entered in favor of the Secretary of Health
and Human Services."43
435. Id.
436. Id. at 194.
437. Id at 194 n.6.
438. The importance of this factor supports California's institution of disclosure
requirements for arbitration organizations, including the requirement that organizations
indicate who won. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. Transparency is an
effective defense against the appearance of bias.
439. Schweiker, 456 U.S. at 194.
440. Id. at 199.
441. Id. at 199-200.
442. Id. at 200 (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 693 (1979)).
443. Id.
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Schweiker 's ultimate disposition suggests the implausibility of finding a
Constitutional violation by NAF or its individual arbitrators. Importantly, however,
the many bases for distinguishing Schweiker from Minnesota v. NAF suggest the
potential application of its reasoning-in combination with that of Caperton-to
both individual arbitrators and the institutions responsible for managing today's
embedded neutrals.
D. Reconsidering the Application of the Supreme Court's Jurisprudence to
AF's Special Case
This exploration of the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence is
especially interesting because it becomes clear that the occurrence of partiality-or
at least the appearance of partiality-is not extraordinary at all when certain
institutions have great power unaccompanied by meaningful accountability
mechanisms, and when those institutions, in turn, give their members, employees
or contractors great power similarly unaccompanied by meaningful accountability
mechanisms. A wise soul once said, "Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts
absolutely."444 There is nothing new here.
A complete review of the Su rerne Court's jurisprudence also reveals that
quite "ordinary" or "garden variety"5 circumstances-the sort that likely occur
every day in municipalities, federal and state agencies, public schools, and
workplaces throughout the nation-have led the Supreme Court to deem some
situations "constitutionally [in] tolerable." This has been true particularly when the
Court has been persuaded by the evidence that has been gathered to show an
inappropriate pecuniary interest in ensuring a particular outcome-even when the
amount of money involved has been small or the interest has been indirect. It
seems that the Court has been more easily persuaded by this evidence when
judging the behavior of an individual adjudicator, like the Ohio mayor-judges or
even Judge Benjamin in Caperton. Gibson, however, demonstrates that with
sufficient evidence, the Court may also be persuaded that an entire adjudicative
entity is not sufficiently impartial to meet the requirements of due process. And
despite its outcome, Schweiker suggests the potential for a violation of due process
when adjudicative functions are delegated to private contractors.
Unlike Caperton, which began as a motion for recusal and thus focused
attention on an individual judge, Schweiker, Withrow, Gibson, Kennedy, and other
cases described herein also demonstrate that institutions may need to bear
responsibility for ensuring due process-and bear the consequences if they fail to
take any action when they have reason to suspect that bias is infecting decision-
making and dispute resolution by their members, employees, or contractors.44
444. John Emerich Edward Dalberg Acton, known as Lord Acton. Letter from
Lord Acton to Bishop Mandell Creighton (Apr. 3, 1887).
445. Though this term is used as a synonym for "ordinary" here, so few people
have and tend their own gardens these days that the term may not longer be appropriate.
Indeed, just as trial has become the "alternative" dispute resolution process in the U.S.,
perhaps "garden variety" ought to connote something special and unique-like heirloom
tomatoes.
446. See SEARLE ARBITRATION REPORT, supra note 38, at xiv (suggesting that in
implementing Due Process protocols, AAA has effectively promoted fair procedures by
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Schweiker is particularly interesting here-and potentially useful-because it
involves the use of contractors and subcontractors, just like the "special case" of
NAF. Though the Supreme Court refused to find a violation of due process in
Schweiker, its analysis clearly demonstrates why the profit-oriented cast of NAF's
financial and corporate structure could-and perhaps should-lead to a finding of
such violation.
There are striking similarities between Schweiker and NAF and its
arbitrators. The powerful repeat player in Schweiker is Health and Human
Services; in NAF's case, it is the credit-card companies. The insurance carriers
likely solicited the opportunity to provide claims processing and dispute resolution
services for Health and Human Services; NAF did the same with the credit-card
companies. Health and Human Services wanted to be sure that its funds were spent
appropriately; the credit-card companies likely were similarly interested in
protecting their fiscal resources. And the hearing officers in Schweiker played a
binding dispute resolution role and relied on referrals from the carriers in much the
same manner that NAF's arbitrators played this role and relied on NAF.
However, there are also significant differences between Schweiker and
NAF. Unlike the hearing officers in Schweiker, NAF's arbitrators did not reject
half of the claims brought by credit-card companies against consumers. Instead,
NAF's arbitrators found for the credit-card companies nearly 95% of the time."
Admittedly, this is not significantly different from the fate of collection actions in
court. It is, however, a higher percentage than the Searle Civil Justice Institute
reported for the AAA's arbitration of consumer disputes brought by businesses."4
8
And, of course, Professor Bartholet received no additional referrals after she
decided against one credit-card company and awarded $48,000 to a consumer.
Further, unlike the situation in Schweiker, Congress did not direct the credit-card
companies to insert mandatory arbitration clauses in their boilerplate contracts or
establish requirements for arbitrators. This was entirely the work of private
actors-the credit-card companies and NAF.
Finally and perhaps most compelling are the public identity of the
defendant in Schweiker and the public interest served by Health and Human
Services' careful stewardship of its resources. These are related factors. The real
defendant in Schweiker was a public agency, not a private insurance carrier-or a
private credit-card company or private ADR provider. The Court found that Health
and Human Services had no inappropriate pecuniary interest. As in Mathews, this
was a federal agency committed to serving its mission-providing coverage under
Part B3-while also ensuring the appropriate use of taxpayers' dollars. The
refusing to administer arbitrations for over 600 companies, based on their violations of the
protocols); Christoper R. Drahozal, A Behavioral Analysis of Private Judging, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 105, 128 (noting that a study by Bingham and
Shimon Sarraf compared outcomes before and after an Employment Due Process Protocol
was implemented and found that employers arbitrating based on personnel handbook
violations were less successful after the protocol was used than they were before the
protocol).
447. See PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 142, at 2.
448. SEARLE ARBITRATION REPORT, supra note 38, at xiii.
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insurance carriers were not themselves defendants; they were merely agents for the
public agency and thus came within the public mantle. In contrast, if the
Minnesota complaint's allegations are accepted as true, it is easy to conclude that
the web of private actors involved in the NAF case-Accretive, Agora, Forthright,
NAF, Mann Bracken, and Axiant-were not motivated by a public interest but by
a shared pecuniary interest in ensuring that consumer arbitration assisted the debt
collection process and the production of profits for all of the investors associated
with that process."49
If we consider the jurisprudence upon which Caperton stands, I believe
that NAF could be found in violation of the Due Process Clause directly or of the
constitutional principles animating the Clause, imported into our understanding of
the Federal Arbitration Act.
CONCLUSION
The field of dispute resolution is at a crucial point in its evolution. With
its institutionalization in the courts, agencies, and the private sector, ADR now is a
sufficiently profitable business to attract the attention of those who will wish to
exploit it. As illustrated, under very narrow circumstances, which may not exist
any longer as credit-card companies hurry to change their boilerplate contracts and
policies in the aftermath of the NAF settlement, the Constitution may be available
to protect the field from others'-or its own-worst excesses.
But do ADR advocates need to wait for such a catastrophe to occur? ADR
has so much promise. Arbitration, which has been the focus of this Article, is a
process that responds to the real needs of real people. Now is the time to embrace
appropriate and rigorous regulation to help protect the best of arbitration and avoid
the occurrence of the worst.
There are several options. The stories of Elizabeth Bartholet and many
other NAF arbitrators suggest that self-regulation may work, particularly if the
institutional framework of dispute resolution organizations is generally sound. But
the story of NAF also suggests that we cannot presume the existence of sound
structures. And then, individual arbitrators will need support. It can be very
difficult to stand firm when one is surrounded by people and a structure that urges
exchange of the lonely virtues of integrity and impartiality for the exciting
drumbeat of status, fame, and (perhaps) lots of money. The story of NAF,
Accretive/Agora, Mann Bracken-joined by the stories of Enron and Wall Street
financiers involved in the bundling and sale of subprime mortgages, etc .--counsel
skepticism and some form of external accountability. Models exist. On one hand,
there is the market-if there truly is easy entry into the market, real competition
involving a sufficient number of competitors, and equal access to relevant and
understandable information. 4 5 0 On the other hand-or perhaps even to assist the
449. Jean R. Stemlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L.
REv. 1631, 1647, 1655 (2005) (examining the replacement of public courts with private
arbitral bodies and considering practices in other countries).
450. See Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability: Privatization, Public-ization,
and Public Values, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y I11, 129-30 (2005); Park, supra note 42,
at 129 n.218.
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operation of the market 45 -there is public regulation. California's disclosure
requirements triggered many of the revelations discussed in this Article. 45 2 In
Australia, law firms are now required by the government to have internal systems
of checks and balances, and the number of complaints against lawyers there has
plummeted by 40% Efforts are afoot in the U.S., meanwhile, to engage law
If the loser in such a system [in which the arbitral institution is
dominated by a single industry and nominates arbitrators who
reappointment and thus compensation indirectly depends on the
satisfaction given to the industry] is a large corporation with access to
counsel, an award based on an unjust process would normally result in a
motion for vacatur, as well as damage to the reputation of the arbitrator
and the supervisory institution. The prospect of such checks and balances
seems less likely if the loser is a low-paid employee who finds it difficult
to muster resources for a challenge or a publicity campaign.
1d; Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration,
67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 300-01 (2004) (identifying difficulties with the argument
that the market offers sufficient accountability).
451. This sort of entanglement could also have the effect of transforming private
arbitral providers into state actors and thus result in direct application of the Due Process
Clause. See, e.g., Cole, Fairness in Securities Arbitration, supra note 232, at 83-97.
452. See also CPR-GEORGETOWN COMM'N ON ETHICS & STANDARDS IN THE
PRACTICE OF ADR, CPR PRINCIPLES FOR ADR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS 9-11 (2002).
These principles provide the following disclosure requirements:
ADR Provider Organizations should take all reasonable steps to provide
clear, accurate and understandable information about the following
aspects of their services and operations:
a. The nature of the ADR Provider Organization's services, operations,
and fees;
b. The relevant economic, legal, professional or other relationships
between the ADR Provider Organization and its affiliated neutrals;
c. The ADR Provider Organization's policies relating to confidentiality,
organizational and individual conflicts of interests, and ethical standards
for neutrals and the Organization;
d. Training and qualifications requirements for neutrals affiliated with
the Organization, as well as other selection criteria for affiliation; and
e. The method by which neutrals are selected for service...
f. The ADR Provider Organization should disclose the existence of any
interests or relationships which are reasonably liely to affect the
impartiality or independence of the Organization or which might
reasonably create the appearance that the Organization is biased against
a party or favorable to another, including
(i) any financial or other interest by the Organization in the outcome;
(ii) any significant financial, business, organizational, professional or
other relationship that the Organization has with any of the parties or
their counsel, including a contractual stream of referrals, a de facto
stream of referrals, or a funding relationship between a party and the
organization; or
(iii) any other significant source of bias or prejudice concerning the
Organization which is reasonably likely to affect impartiality or might
reasonably create an appearance of partiality or bias.
Id. The Georgetown CPR Principles have not been cited in any court opinions.
453. Steven Mark & Tahlia Gordon, Innovations in Regulation-Responding to a
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firms more directly in ensuring ethical practice, 5 while insurers may be using
financial incentives to encourage their insureds to increase the accuracy of their
awards and reduce conflicts of interest. 5
A somewhat less direct means of encouraging institutions to establish
internal controls to assist their individual arbitrators would be to abandon
deferential judicial review when there has been a sufficient showing that: (1) an
outcome has been produced by an embedded neutral; (2) the situation involved a
Changing Legal Services Market, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 501, 510-14 (2009) (reporting
on empirical studies showing increased ethical management and a reduction in complaints
against Australian lawyers/firms after firms put self-assessment tools into place); Laurel
Terry, Nat'l Ass'n of Bar Counsel, A Modest Proposal (Aug. 9, 2008), available at
http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/ls/st3presntations%/2fo&0 /o20webpage/nobc /20a /
20modest%20proposal.pdf (regarding firm self-assessment tools---"appropriate
management systems" -that are currently available); cf. JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC
JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY' CLAIMS 222 (1983) (discussing internal
controls as a sound method of producing administrative accuracy). See also Neal Katyal &
Richard Caplan, The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the Legality of the NSA Surveillance
Program: The FDR Precedent, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1023, 1072-73 (2008)
In other work, one of us has outlined a variety of concrete mechanisms
that can help build an institutional apparatus, and culture, of internal
checks and balances. Some of those mechanisms center on the need to
change the architecture of the federal bureaucracy-create institutional
friction and to play upon it. Just as government can function better when
the Departments of State and Defense have overlapping mandates and
resulting tensions, so, too, it might be the case that rivalries can be
exploited through other agencies, such as the Department of Homeland
Security and the Justice Department. Instead of the standard separation
of powers-whereby Congress checks the President, and the courts
check both-the bureaucracy itself can be structured to create internal
checks.. .. Some reforms involve changes within individual agencies
themselves. Vibrant civil service protections are often necessary so that
employees feel they can do their job without reprisal. Agencies might
consider borrowing here from the foreign service, where longstanding
policies create the conditions for a bureaucracy that is, comparatively
speaking, focused on long-term horizons and the development of
balanced policy. Indeed, the State Department has explicit procedures in
place that permnit foreign service officers to dissent and warn Washington
of actions they feel are problematic in the field. The Foreign Service
Officer who uses this so-called 'dissent channel' in the most productive
way each year wins an award.
Id.
454. See, for example, the debates over the ethical obligations of law firms as
currently described in Rule 5. 1. Professor Ted Schneyer has urged the need to discipline law
firms, not just individual lawyers. Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline of Law Firms?, 77
CORNELL L. Rev. 1, 13 (1992). This led to proposed revisions to Rule 8.4 in Ethics 2000.
455. See Leo Herzel & Dale E. Coiling, The Chinese Wall and Conflict of Interest
in Banks, 34 Bus. LAW. 73, 114 (1978) (recommending interdepartmental information walls
to reduce bank conflicts); Brief for Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at *15, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343
(2008) (No. 06-923), 2008 WL 596062 (suggesting that insurers have incentives to reward
claims processors for their accuracy).
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contest between a powerful institutional repeat player and a less-powerful
institutional or individual one-time player; 4 5 6 (3) the more powerful repeat-player
selected the individual embedded neutral or the dispute resolution organization
which employed or contracted with the individual neutral; and (4) the more
powerful repeat-player institution failed to establish any meaningful structural
counterbalances. 5  Certainly there are other models that could be explored. 5
456. Distinguishing between repeat players and one-time players will be difficult,
but we can look to other areas of law for guidance. See, e.g., Vorsheck v. Comm'r, 933 F.2d
757, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1991) (differential application of tax law to non-sophisticated
couple); Heasley v. Comm'r, 902 F.2d 380, 381, 385 (5th Cir. 1990) (waiving penalty for
couple with no advanced business experience that relied on financial advisor in investing in
tax shelter); MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Cent. Bank of Monroe, 838 F.2d 1382, 1387 (5th Cir.
1988) (taking notice of line of cases that held consumers to different standard than
businesses in certain situations if court found that strict adherence to contract term would
produce overly harsh results); In re Garza, No. 95-6037, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1810 at *46..
47 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. July 22, 2005) (businessmen presumed to know the harm that will
result from conversion of secured party's collateral); In re Khanani, No. 6:04-bk-07648-
ABB, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1876, at *21 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2005) (experienced
business held to higher standard of care). But see Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499
U.S. 585, 597-98 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (expressing outrage at enforcement of
forum selection clause against elderly couple who resided in Washington but were forced by
terms of purchase-which they did not even see until after making purchase-to litigate in
Florida); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 488-90 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (worrying that decision will result in personal jurisdiction over unsophisticated
individuals who enter into contracts with sophisticated businesses); Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec.
Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1476, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (presuming that repeat-player plaintiffs
lawyers will police ranks of arbitrators and noting interestingly that "wise employers and
their representatives should see no benefit in currying the favor of corrupt arbitrators,
because this simply will invite increased judicial review of arbitral judgments"); Rubino v.
Circuit City Stores, 758 N.E.2d 1, 16 n.3 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (Campbell, J., dissenting)
(referencing Fair Debt Collection Practices Act to aid unsophisticated consumer); Llewellyn
Joseph Gibb ons, Private Law, Public "Justice ": Another Look at Privacy, Arbitration, and
Global E-Co~nmerce, 150OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 769, 782 (2000).
457. This approach has been used in other contexts, such as trust law. See, e.g.,
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (2008).
The conflict of interest at issue here . .. should prove more important
(perhaps of great importance) where circumstances suggest a higher
likelihood that it affected the benefits decision, including, but not limited
to, cases where an insurance company administrator has a history of
biased claims administration. It should prove less important (perhaps to
the vanishing point) where the administrator has taken active steps to
reduce potential bias and to promote accuracy, for example, by walling
off claims administrators from those interested in firm finances, or by
imposing management checks that penalize inaccurate decisionmaking
irrespective of whom the inaccuracy benefits.
Id.; Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052-53 (7th Cir.
1987) ("When the members of the tribunal-for example, the trustees of a pension plan-
have a serious conflict of interest, the proper deference to give their decision may be slight.
even zero . . . . There may be in effect a sliding scale of judicial review of trustees'
decisions more penetrating the greater is the suspicion of partiality, less penetrating the
smaller that suspicion is."); see also Chad M. Oldfather, Universal De Novo Review, 77
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The story of NAF is a wake-up call. Will we rise up and do what it takes
to reform-and thus protect the integrity of-these "alternative" processes and
neutrals? Or will we hit the snooze button one more time and pull those covers
back over our faces, returning to our cozy dream of a world of "no possessions..
no need for greed or hunger, [a] brotherhood of man",459? That is a beautifu,
alluring dream .4 6 0 But it seems that every utopia that has been created on this earth
has the potential to degenerate into a dystopic nightmare. Instead, let's dream a
more realistic dream of checks and balances-throwing off our covers and bracing
for both the frightening exhilaration and hard work of the struggle that is the real
world.
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 317, 328-29 (2009) (noting that appellate review reduces error
and increases the quality of decision-making); Stempel, Mandating Minimum Quality, supra
note 28, at 428-31 (proposing imposition of same standards of judicial review that are
imposed upon trial courts--e.g., clearly erroneous for challenges to fact-finding; abuse of
discretion for exercises of judicial discretion; de novo for application of law). But see Jill 1.
Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty: The Regulation of Fairness in Securities Arbitration, 76 U.
CE.4. L. REv. 493, 517-18 (2008) (asserting that judicial review is not effective to ensure
fairness in arbitration, but SEC oversight is effective).
458. Th1ey include: offering "alternative" dispute resolution only through
independent, financially stable entities-perhaps public, perhaps the joint venture of
normally competing entities; revising the standard that a neutral must use when deciding
whether to recuse herself in response to a party's objection (using 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) as a
model); revising the procedure to be used when a party seeks a neutral's recusal; revising
the standard used by courts for vacatur based on partiality; ending quasi-judicial immunity
or conditioning the grant of such immunity upon sufficient appearance of impartiality;
permitting parties to "strike" a neutral if there is even an appearance of bias; requiring
court-connected neutrals to take the judge's oath to uphold justice; developing and funding
effective monitoring and evaluation of neutrals; professionalizing neutrals, so that they
share norms, values, and an understanding of best practice; establishing independent dispute
resolution regulatory bodies; providing for rescission of mediated agreements within a
limited time period or upon a prima facie showing of the appearance of partiality; and
providing for a change of burden of proof regarding existence/importance of conflict of
interest upon prima facie showing of appearance of partiality.
459. JOHN~ LENNON, Imagine, on IMAGINE (Apple Records 197 1).
460. Although not exactly gender inclusive.
